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ALMOST TWO DECADES have now passed since U.S. productivity  growth 
first showed signs of slowing, more than 15 years since the first paper 
on that  topic appeared  in this  journal.  1 Overall,  the slowdown  continues 
with little relief; in the nonfarm  business sector the annual  growth  rate 
for both output  per hour  and  multifactor  productivity  was more  than 1.5 
percentage  points slower during 1973-87 than during  1948-73.2 If the 
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1. William  D.  Nordhaus, "The Recent Productivity  Slowdown," BPEA, 3:1972, 
pp. 493-536. 
2. Multifactor  productivity  growth  is computed  (sqe equation  1 below) as the rate of 
growth  of output  minus  the weighted  average  of the rates  of growth  of inputs  (capital  and 
labor when output is value added; energy and materials  are included  otherwise). The 
weights  are  the shares  of the factors  in total  cost. 
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productivity  slowdown continues, it must inevitably  reduce the ability 
of the United States to increase its per capita income and wealth,  just 
as it has already resulted in a near-total cessation in the growth of 
economywide real hourly compensation  since 1973.3  In this sense the 
productivity  growth  slowdown  might  be described  as America's  greatest 
economic  problem. 
Even as economists remain  perplexed  about the nature  of the slow- 
down, a new puzzle has presented itself. Productivity  has recovered 
strongly  in part  of the economy while worsening  elsewhere. The revival 
is in manufacturing  productivity,  where growth  in the past half-decade 
has been almost  enough  to wipe out the entire 1973-87  deficit  compared 
with 1948-73. The worsening trend is in nonfarm  nonmanufacturing, 
where  output  per hour  has grown  at close to a zero rate  on average  since 
1973,  while multifactor  productivity  growth  has been negative. 
Key Measurement  Problems in the Aggregate and Industry Data 
One  goal of this paper  is to answer  the perplexing  question  that  arises 
again  and again:  "Can measurement  errors  'explain'  all, some, or none 
of the post-1973  U.S. productivity  growth slowdown?" Our  answer is 
"some,  but not much." On the basis of hard evidence and some 
speculation,  we conclude  that  measurement  errors  are  unlikely  to explain 
more than one-third  of the post-1973 slowdown in nonfarm  business 
private output  per hour-about  0.5 percentage  point of the total slow- 
down of 1.6 percentage  points. 
But  the  paper  is about  far  more  than  measurement  and  the  productivity 
slowdown. We have both an educational  and investigative  purpose. We 
begin by examining  the latest official measures  of productivity  growth 
and the slowdown  and explaining  the steps required  to develop produc- 
tivity measures  at the aggregate  and industry  levels. 
We emphasize the distinction  between aggregate  and industry  data 
because many sources of measurement  error do not help explain the 
3. The annual  growth  rate  of business  sector  real  compensation  per  hour  during  1973- 
87 was 0.3 percent, as contrasted  to a rate for per capita  real disposable  income of 1.4 
percent  (see Economic Report of the President, February 1988, tables  B-46  and  B-27).  The 
serious  implications  of the productivity  problem  for the American  standard  of living  have 
been disguised  in part  by the movement  of women into the labor  force, but this rise in 
labor-force  participation  has already  slowed  and  in any case cannot  be sustained  forever. Martin Neil Baily, Robert J. Gordon  349 
post-1973 slowdown. To affect the estimated size of the overall slow- 
down,  a given  measurement  problem  must  have  caused  aggregate  output 
growth to have been understated more (or aggregate input growth 
overstated  more)  after 1973  than  before. 
In contrast, a measurement  problem that understates the output 
growth of a particular  industry, without any direct implications for 
aggregate  output,  merely  reshuffles  measurement  of productivity  growth 
among  industries.  For instance, an understatement  of output  growth  in 
the  railroad  freight  industry  would  be a pure  industry  phenomenon,  since 
all of railroad  freight  output  is an intermediate  good. But an understate- 
ment  of real  consumer  purchases  of air  transportation  would  contaminate 
measures  of productivity  growth  both in the airline  industry  and in the 
economy as a whole. Many debates about productivity  measurement 
concern  the validity  of industry  measures. Our  findings  imply more  for 
the industry allocation of productivity growth than for the overall 
magnitude  of the slowdown. 
A useful way to summarize  this point is to establish  four quadrants 
on a simple grid as a classification  of actual or possible measurement 
errors. 
Affects aggregate  economy,  Affects aggregate  economy, 
contributes  to post-1973  same  effect before  and  after 
slowdown  1973 
No aggregate  effect,  No aggregate  effect, same 
contributes  to post-1973  effect before  and  after 1973 
slowdown  for an industry  for an industry 
Only measurement  issues that qualify  for the northwest  quadrant  will 
help  to explain  the productivity  growth  slowdown. Issues relating  to the 
southwest quadrant  merely  reshuffle  the industry  allocation  of produc- 
tivity change.'  Issues entering  the quadrants  in the eastern half of the 
table  could create a secular  bias in productivity  at the aggregate  (north- 
east) or industry (southeast) levels, but have no implications  for the 
slowdown. 
The tour of the basic data and the measurement  primer  are followed 
by the core of the paper, our investigation  into "The Case of Multiple 
Mismeasurement."  Almost everywhere  we look, we find  culprits,  some 
of which  imply  only a misallocation  of productivity  growth  at  the industry 
level, but  others  of which  contribute  a  partial  explanation  of the aggregate 
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output by industry makes it difficult to diagnose the causes of the 
slowdown. Inferences about the importance of capital formation or 
education  may be falsified  by errors  in industry  output  or input  data. 
For a mismeasurement  to help explain  the aggregate  slowdown, it is 
necessary  that  something  be different  about  how output  or input  is being 
measured  post-1973.  It is not enough  just to point a finger  at a perennial 
problem  like "unmeasured  quality improvements."  Instead, we must 
show that  official  measures  have gotten  less accurate.  Such  a conclusion 
does not require that measurement  methods at the official agencies, 
particularly  the Bureau  of Labor Statistics (BLS) and Bureau  of Eco- 
nomic  Analysis  (BEA), have actually  deteriorated.  Rather,  the economy 
may have changed  in ways that make  conventional  measurement  meth- 
ods less accurate.  Our  review of the ways in which  mismeasurement  has 
become a greater  problem  in the slowdown period features four main 
themes: computers,  construction,  convenience, and consistency. 
Main Themes: Computers, Construction, Convenience, 
Consistency 
The explosion of computer  power during  the past decade is at the 
heart of the economy's movement toward activities that are hard for 
conventional  methods  to measure  and provides a plausible  reason why 
measurement  errors  might  have overstated  the extent of the post-1973 
slowdown. The construction  industry's  40 percent  productivity  decline 
strains credulity. Convenience, an unmeasured  product increasingly 
available  in the retail  sector, could  in principle  involve additions  of value 
to  household well-being as  important as  those contributed by  the 
computer. Finally, the presence or absence of  consistency among 
alternative  sources of data provides a way of identifying  measurement 
problems  worthy  of further  scrutiny. 
COMPUTER  POWER 
An important  part of the revival of manufacturing  productivity  and 
part  of the reason for weak labor  productivity  and negative  multifactor 
productivity  (MFP)  growth  in nonfarm  nonmanufacturing  is that  official 
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but apparently  little productivity  improvement  in their use. Stemming 
from the introduction  (beginning  in early 1986)  of a hedonic  price index 
for computers into the U.S.  national income and product accounts 
(NIPA), all official U.S.  output, productivity, and MFP data now 
incorporate  the effects of this computer price index, which declines 
during  1969-87  at an annual  rate of 14  percent. This large  imputed  price 
decline yields an annual average increase of productivity  in the non- 
electrical  machinery  industry  of nearly 12  percent  a year  during  1979-87 
and an annual  average increase of real computer  investment over the 
same period of  24 percent.4 Introducing numbers like this into an 
otherwise  sluggish  economy does startling  things  to the data, especially 
for such ratios as the relative  price of capital, investment-to-GNP,  and 
capital-to-GNP. 
The phrase "computer power" rather than "computers" better 
describes this element of the productivity  story, because the hedonic 
deflator  for computers  amounts to measuring  the price of a computer 
"calculation"  rather  than  a computer  "box. " A key issue for this paper, 
therefore, is to explore why official data seem not to be showing the 
payoff  from  investments  in computer  power. What  has all that  computer 
power been doing, and where is the "black hole" into which all those 
computers  are disappearing? 
We explore the computer  issue in three ways in this paper. First, we 
examine  conceptually  what  activities  are  performed  by computers,  how 
such activities should be treated  in principle,  and how in practice they 
might  be missed altogether  in standard  data, be undertaken  for reasons 
that are privately  profitable  even though  socially unproductive,  or lead 
to short-term  inefficiency of resource use.  Second, we look at how 
computers have affected economywide data and how current index 
number  methodology  may  lead to incorrect  aggregate  capital  and  output 
series. Third, we make a detailed case study of a key service sector, 
finance,  insurance,  and  real  estate (FIRE),  in which  computers  have had 
a big impact. 
4. Nonelectrical  machinery  includes  the  computerindustry.  Forinvestment,  the  figures 
given are the fixed-weight  deflator  and real investment  for the "Office, Computing,  and 
Accounting  Machinery"  (OCAM)  component  of producers'  durable  equipment,  NIPA, 
tables  7.13  and  5.7, respectively.  These  refer  to all  office  machinery  (other  than  photocopy), 
of which  computer  systems  (processors  and  peripherals)  now make  up a share  of about  80 
percent.  The annual  rate of change in the deflator  for computer  systems is about -  17 
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CONSTRUCTION 
The computer  quagmire  is only the newest and most dramatic  of the 
measurement  issues intrinsic  to the more general  productivity  puzzle. 
An old perennial  is the deflation  of structures  and the measurement  of 
construction  output.  The  NIPA measure  of construction  output  per hour 
fell in absolute  terms  almost  40 percent  between 1967  and 1987;  through- 
out 1982-87 it was lower than it was in 1948. We undertake  a second 
case study  to evaluate  the extent of measurement  errors  in construction, 
putting  together a wide variety of data on output, prices, and quality, 
and exhibiting  a highly  suggestive  contrast  between U.S. and Canadian 
productivity. 
CONVENIENCE 
In searching  for shifts in the economy that might  have made  produc- 
tivity more  difficult  to measure  after 1973,  we are struck  by the pervasive 
emergence  of consumer  services that  offer  improved  convenience,  from 
the suitably named 24-hour "convenience" stores to fast food stores 
creating  millions  of "McJobs" to extended supermarket  hours to auto- 
matic-teller  machines. Mismeasurement  in price indexes for consumer 
services may  be the single  most  fruitful  area  in which  to search  for errors 
that  have implications  for the aggregate  (as opposed  to industry)  produc- 
tivity slowdown, simply because consumer  purchases  of services now 
amount to fully 35 percent of GNP, more than all nonconsumption 
components of GNP combined. Our third case study, of retail trade, 
shows that  since 1972  an enormous  gap  has emerged  between  productiv- 
ity growth  in the food and nonfood components,  with stagnation  in the 
former and steady growth in the latter at almost the same pace as in 
manufacturing.  We present some intriguing  detailed  data on the super- 
market  industry  showing that firms  may have deliberately  taken steps 
that reduced measured labor productivity in order to produce more 
convenience, variety, and quality. 
CONSISTENCY 
Inconsistency in two measures  of the same concept waves a flag to 
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the BLS develops some of its own industry  productivity  series that are 
independent  of the NIPA value-added  measures  of industry  output.  And 
many industry  associations produce output or productivity  data from 
their  own surveys. These series are sometimes  at variance  with output 
and productivity  measures  based on NIPA data. Sometimes  the incon- 
sistencies are resolvable without postulating  an error in either series, 
but we have found in our case studies that investigating  the inconsis- 
tencies has pointed  to major  measurement  problems.  For example, the 
stark contrast between U.S.  and Canadian  measures of construction 
productivity  strengthens  the case against the official U.S.  series. As 
another example, the sharply different NIPA and BLS measures of 
output  growth  in the airline  industry  led us to the use of the CPI  for air 
transportation  as the underlying  culprit;  it vastly exaggerates  inflation 
in airline fares by neglecting to take account of the introduction  of 
discount  fares. 
Other Themes of the Study and Its Limitations 
Our  main  measure  of productivity  is average  labor  productivity  (ALP), 
so that  measurement  errors  in computing  the labor  input  are  as important 
as those for output. Hours  of work are measured  subject  to some error, 
but more important  is the discrepancy  between measured  labor hours 
and an economic concept of labor  input  into a production  function. An 
hour  of work by a teenager  with a high school education  is not the same 
labor input as an hour of work by an experienced, mature, college- 
educated  worker.  Standard  productivity  series ignore  this difference. 
Although  we focus most attention  on average  labor  productivity,  we 
also report  multifactor  productivity  series. Our  greater  attention  to ALP 
simply reflects data availability, since MFP measures require scarce 
data on capital  input  by industry  of use; however, the measurement  of 
capital  goods prices is important  regardless  of whether  ALP or MFP is 
at issue. Capital  goods are  part  of GNP, the capital  stock is used directly 
in the calculation  of MFP, and capital  output  per hour is an important 
determinant  of ALP. This paper draws on Robert Gordon's argument 
that inflation  has been overstated and real output understated  for the 
capital  goods sector, with the result  that  growth  in aggregate  real GNP, 
ALP, and the capital stock have all been understated.  A central  impli- 
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goods iceberg; numerous  other capital  goods have exhibited dramatic 
declines in nominal  or real prices, including  the single largest category 
of producers'  durable  equipment,  communications  equipment,  for  which 
no government  price index is computed  by either  the BEA or BLS. 
A  CAVEAT 
Our goal is to focus attention on conceptual issues, particularly 
regarding  computers  and convenience, and to demonstrate  in our case 
studies that measurement  can indeed be improved. We are interested 
not  just in pointing  at culprits  but in suggesting  where current  methods 
of data  collection  can  be improved  and  in setting  down  a research  agenda. 
Through  it all, we stress the intrinsic  interest and importance  of mea- 
surement  issues themselves. We do not suggest that they will solve the 
productivity  slowdown  puzzle in its entirety. 
PLAN  OF  THE  PAPER 
The paper  is divided  roughly  into thirds. The first  third  contains  our 
broad-brush  introduction  to the official  data at both the aggregate  and 
industry levels,  starting with a report on the latest news about the 
aggregate  productivity  slowdown  in both ALP and  MFP. We review the 
basic arithmetic  of GNP measurement  by final demand, income, and 
industry  product  originating,  to identify  the steps in measurement  most 
likely to introduce errors and review productivity performance by 
industry  and its implications.  The middle  part  of the paper  concentrates 
on labor  and capital  input. After reviewing  recent findings  by others on 
changes in labor quality, we turn to our core topic of measuring  the 
output and capital input  of producers'  durables,  with special attention 
to computers and other products where technical progress has been 
rapid.  The last third  of the paper  consists of our four case studies. The 
first,  for finance,  insurance,  and  real  estate, treats  an industry  where the 
influence  of the computer  has been pervasive; the second covers con- 
struction;  the third,  retail  trade, where convenience is an issue; and the 
fourth,  transportation,  where  we find  a lack  of consistency  in  government 
measures. The paper ends with some ballpark  estimates of the overall 
impact  of measurement  errors  in explaining  the aggregate  productivity 
slowdown  and  with  suggestions  for ways in which  government  statistical 
agencies could improve  their  methods. Martin Neil Baily, Robert J. Gordon  355 
Table 1.  Average Annual Aggregate Productivity Growth,  1948-87,  Selected Periods 




Measure  1948-73  1973-79  1979-87  1973-87  1973-87 
Output  per hour 
Business  2.94  0.62  1.32  1.02  -1.92 
Nonfarm  business  2.45  0.48  1.11  0.84  -  1.61 
Manufacturing  2.82  1.38  3.39  2.52  -0.30 
Nonmanufacturing  2.32  0.16  0.33  0.25  - 2.07 
Multifactor  productivity 
Business  2.00  0.10  0.61  0.39  -  1.61 
Nonfarm  business  1.68  - 0.08  0.45  0.22  -  1.46 
Manufacturing  2.03  0.52  2.56  1.68  - 0.35 
Nonmanufacturing  1.55  - 0.29  - 0.28  - 0.30  -  1.85 
Sources:  Data for 1948, 1973, and 1979 taken from U.S.  Department of Commerce,  Bureau of Economic  Analysis, 
The Nationtal Income  and Product Accounts  of the Unzited  States,  1929-82,  Statistical  Tables (Government  Printing 
Office, September  1986), tables 6.2 and 6.11. Data for 1987 taken from Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic 
Analysis,  Suirvey of Current Business,  vol.  68 (July  1988), tables 6.2 and 6.11.  Multifactor productivity  taken from 
Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics,  "Multifactor Productivity Measures,  1987," News,  September 30, 
1988. 
Aggregate  Productivity  and Its Breakdown  by Industry 
Table  1 exhibits  alternative aggregate productivity  series,  including 
the BLS's  MFP figures. All of the series show a large growth slowdown 
after 1973 and a partial recovery  after 1979.5 The recovery  in manufac- 
turing has taken the growth rate for that sector since 1979 well above its 
1948-73 average,  while productivity  growth in the nonfarm nonmanu- 
facturing sector  has been  stuck  near zero  since  1973. The post-1973 
slowdown  in  manufacturing has  almost  disappeared,  even  when  the 
years 1973-79 are included,  as shown in the right-hand column in table 
1, while the nonfarm nonmanufacturing slowdown exceeds  2 percentage 
points a year. Business productivity growth exceeds  that of the nonfarm 
business sector and, because the shift of resources out of farming is now 
very small, the implication is that farm productivity has been growing at 
a relatively fast rate since 1973, especially  since 1979. 
The relationship between growth in ALP and growth in MFP has been 
well known since the early studies by Robert Solow and Edward Denison 
5. We do not claim  that 1979  was necessarily  the turning  point,  but  movements  of the 
economy  into  and  out  of recessions  in the years 1980-83  disqualify  any  year  in that  interval 
from  consideration  as an alternative  candidate  without  an explicit  regression  analysis  of 
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three  decades  ago. Designating  real  output  by Q, labor  input  by L, capital 
input  by K, and  the income share  of labor  by cx,  we have: 
(1)  dln(ALP) = dInQ - dlnL, and 
dln(MFP)  =  dlnQ -  axdlnL  -  (1 -  ax)dlnK 
= dlnQ - dlnL -  (1 -  ax)(dlnK- dlnL). 
Because  the MFP  growth  series in the bottom  section  of table 1 subtracts 
growth in capital input  as well as in labor input  from growth in output 
(applying  the appropriate  weights as in equation  1), and  because capital 
input  throughout  the postwar  period  has grown  more  rapidly  than  labor 
input, each figure  in the bottom section of table 1 is smaller than the 
corresponding  figure  in the top section. The MFP  data  confirm  that  since 
1979  manufacturing  productivity  growth  has exceeded that  before 1973, 
although  a small slowdown remains  for the full period 1973-87. But in 
the nonfarm  nonmanufacturing  sector, MFP growth is negative, and it 
is just barely  positive over 1973-87  for the nonfarm  business sector as a 
whole. 
THE  SIMPLE  ARITHMETIC  OF  GDP  ESTIMATES 
The  NIPA in  the United  States  rely  on final  sales of goods and  services 
as the primary  source of information  on output. GNP is the sum of 
consumption  and  investment  expenditures,  government  purchases,  and 
net exports. Subtracting  net foreign  income  yields GDP, and subtracting 
the production  of government  (in the form of payments to employees) 
gives private  GDP. Compensation  of employees in nonprofit  organiza- 
tions and  the imputed  rent  paid  on owner-occupied  housing  are included 
in final  sales, so that  when these figures  are subtracted  off, the resulting 
aggregate  becomes GDP originating  in the business sector. The specific 
magnitudes  of these deductions  from  GNP are shown in table  2.6 
6.  From  Jerome  A. Mark,  "Problems  Encountered  in Measuring  Single-  and  Multifac- 
tor  Productivity,"  Monthly  LaborReview,  vol. 109  (December  1986),  table  1, p. 5. Original 
data from Bureau  of Economic  Analysis, U.S. Department  of Commerce.  Government 
enterprises  are included  in business  output  for the calculation  of labor  productivity,  but 
excluded  in the multifactor  productivity  calculations  because  of a lack  of capital  data  from 
this sector. The concept  of private  business  output  displayed  in this table  is that  used by 
the BLS and, by excluding  owner-occupied  housing  and  the statistical  discrepancy,  does 
not correspond  to the NIPA concept of business product  displayed  in NIPA tables 1.12 
and 1.13. Martin Neil Baily, Robert J. Gordon  357 




Category  dollars  Percent 
GNP  3,585.2  100.0 
Less: General  government  355.5  9.9 
Owner-occupied  housing  209.4  5.8 
Rest of world  37.0  1.0 
Households, nonprofits  140.0  3.9 
Government  enterprises  43.9  1.2 
Statistical  discrepancy  - 5.0  -0.1 
Equals:  Private  business output  2,804.4  78.2 
Source:  Jerome  A.  Mark, "Problems  Encountered  in Measuring Single-  and Multifactor Productivity,"  Montlldy 
Labor Review,  vol.  109 (December  1986), table  1, p. 5. 
In computing  current-dollar  GNP from  final  sales, some output  in the 
underground  and illegal economies will inevitably  be missed, and any 
such omissions will flow through  the above subtractions  to contaminate 
current-dollar  business GDP. It is likely that small  businesses and self- 
employed persons conceal part of their legitimate  activity in order to 
avoid taxes, and the underground  economy is reputed  to have grown 
rapidly  in recent years, leading  to a downward  bias in GDP  growth.7  We 
do not find  the evidence  presented  on this issue to be terribly  persuasive, 
however, at least with  respect  to its implications  for  productivity.8  First, 
even if the underground  economy has grown, this probably  would have 
raised  productivity  growth, because labor  input  is concealed as well as 
output,  and  the underground  activities  are surely  low-productivity  ones. 
7.  Edgar  L. Feige, "How Big Is the Irregular  Economy?" Challenge  (November- 
December  1979),  pp. 5-13; and  Feige, "The  Theory  and  Measurement  of the Unobserved 
Sector  of the Economy:  Causes,  Consequences  and  Implications,"  paper  delivered  at the 
93rd  annual  meeting  of the American  Economic Association, September  6, 1980;  Vito 
Tanzi,  ed.,  The Underground Economy  in the  United  States  and Abroad  (Lexington, 
1982). 
8. Edward  Denison  has  critiqued  the underground  economy  literature.  See Edward  F. 
Denison,  "Is U.S. Growth  Understated  Because  of the Underground  Economy?  Employ- 
ment  Ratios  Suggest  Not, " Review  ofIncome  and Wealth  (March  1982),  pp. 1-16;  Denison, 
"Accounting  for Slower  Economic  Growth:  An Update," paper  presented  to the Confer- 
ence  on International  Comparisons  of Productivity,  American  Enterprise  Institute,  Wash- 
ington, D.C.,  September 30, 1982; and Denison,  Trends in American Economic  Growth, 
1929-82 (Brookings, 1985) (see pp. 56-57 for additional  references to the literature). 
Denison has reminded  us that the BEA does adjust GNP based upon an estimate of 
underreporting  from the Internal  Revenue Service. In addition,  it is correct to exclude 
most  illegal  activities,  such  as drug  selling,  from  GNP. 358  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1988 
Second, the sharp  reduction  in marginal  tax rates in the 1980s should 
have shifted  both output  and employment  into the recorded  economy. 
There is no sign of such a shift in GNP growth or the employment-to- 
population  ratio. We will assume, therefore, that the nominal  value of 
business  GDP  is known  with a relatively  high  degree  of accuracy. 
DEFLATION  ERRORS  AT  THE  AGGREGATE  LEVEL 
A greater  potential  for error  is introduced  when the nominal  value of 
GDP is deflated to give real business GDP using about 800 different 
commodity  deflators.  Most of these deflators  are components  either of 
the consumer price index (CPI) or the producer  price index (PPI). In 
some cases, however, there is no genuine deflator  and for some com- 
modities,  real  production  is inferred  from  the number  of people  employed 
in producing  them. Some services such  as banking  fall  into  this category. 
The breakdown  of 1985 private business output by type of deflation 
method  is shown in table 3.9  Factor  payments  are used as a deflator  for 
8.5 percent of output, leaving about 92 percent of the total that has a 
legitimate  price deflator. 
Even in cases where there is a legitimate  deflator,  however, the split 
between real output change and inflation  is not necessarily made cor- 
rectly. Price indexes for durable  goods may miss quality  improvements 
taking  the form of improved  performance,  reduced energy use, and a 
lower frequency  of repair.  Price reductions  that often occur in the first 
few years  after  the introduction  of a new product  may  be missed through 
its late incorporation  into the CPI  or PPI. Compared  with  a sizable  body 
of research on the deflation of durable  goods, the study of errors in 
service prices is  just beginning.  One  reason  for slow reported  productiv- 
ity growth in services is that increases in computers  and support  staff 
may be providing an improved quality of services, or entirely new 
services, that the service deflators  are not capturing.  We also believe 
that there may be a widespread  failure  of existing deflators  to capture 
the upgrading  of service quality  that occurs when, for instance, super- 
markets  offer a broader  selection, a barber  installs  air  conditioning,  or a 
hotel equips every bathroom  with a phone and TV set. As the four- 
quadrant  diagram  in the introduction  makes clear, however, if the poor 
9.  From  Mark,  "Problems  Encountered  in Measuring  Single-  and  Multifactor  Produc- 
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Table 3.  Real Private Business Output, by Type of Deflation Method,  1985 Values 
Billions of 
1982 
Item  dollars  Percent 
Portion  deflated  by compensation 
or cost indexes  238.5  8.5 
Nonresidential  structures  152.2  5.4 
Other  86.3  3.1 
Portion  deflated  by price indexes  2,565.9  91.5 
Total  2,804.4  100.0 
Source:  Mark, "Problems  Encountered  in Measuring Single- and Multifactor Productivity." 
deflation  of durable  goods output  or of services output  contributes  to the 
explanation  of the ALP growth  slowdown, the shares  of these commod- 
ities must  have risen  as a share  of total  business  product,  or unmeasured 
quality  improvement  must have increased  in importance.  In the case of 
services, these possibilities seem plausible, both because the overall 
share of services has risen and because some of the poorly measured 
areas, such as financial  services, have seen much innovation  in recent 
years. 
FROM  AGGREGATE  INCOME  AND  PRODUCT  TO  INDUSTRY 
PRODUCT  ORIGINATING 
Because of the identity between income and product, GNP is also 
equal to the sum of all income payments. Data on income are available 
from tax and Securities and Exchange Commission records, so after 
allowing  for  capital  consumption  allowances,  GNP  can  also be computed 
from  income.  The  reported  statistical  discrepancy  in  the  two calculations 
usually lies in the range +  0.2 percent of GNP. That discrepancy, 
however, is what remains  after BEA has done its best to bring about 
consistency. Income and product data are adjusted  based upon areas 
where  BEA  judges there  are reporting  errors. 
Once income payments  associated with government,  nonprofit  orga- 
nizations,  and foreign  activities are subtracted  from  total income, what 
remains  is income generated in the business sector, which should be 
equal to the GDP originating  in that sector. The BEA's attempts to 
allocate this income by industry  encounter difficulties,  because many 
companies span several industries. The allocation of most employee 
compensation  can be made reasonably  well by industry,  although  head 360  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1988 
office staff do provide services to divisions and plants and sometimes 
vice versa. Interest  income is allocated, often crudely, to the industry 
designated as the primary industry of a company, and profits and 
depreciation  must  be assigned  by industry  without  adequate  data.  There 
is thus a potential  for error  in the allocation  of current-dollar  business 
GDP  into its industry  components. 
DEFLATION  AT  THE  INDUSTRY  LEVEL 
The potential for error is much greater for real GDP by industry, 
however, than for the current-dollar  values. Deflating value added 
requires  estimates of both prices and quantities  of intermediate  goods 
and services. The NIPA were set up to measure  final  goods and  services 
production, rather than intermediate  production, and the data base 
reflects this. In practice the survey coverage of prices of intermediate 
goods is quite limited, and the quantities of purchases and sales of 
intermediate  goods are not known  from year to year, so extrapolations 
are made from census years. For the manufacturing  sector, the annual 
survey does provide more frequent  information  on product  flows, and 
the Census Bureau  develops its own estimates of value added. Unfor- 
tunately,  the survey does not ask about  purchased  services, so there is 
no direct comparison  between income and value added even in manu- 
facturing.  Moreover,  the survey does not ask about the composition  of 
product  purchases,  except for energy. 
Industry Productivity Trends 
Average labor  productivity  for the major  industries  of the economy 
is shown in table 4 for various subintervals  over 1948-87. Productivity 
figures  for government,  nonprofit  organizations,  and  private  households 
are given for completeness;  growth  rates in these sectors would  be zero 
except for  mix  effects and  quirks  in  the way the numbers  are  put  together. 
Table 4, like table 1, dates the slowdown at 1973  and compares  perfor- 
mance pre- and post-1973.10  The post-1973 decline in growth in the 
10. This treatment  conceals the fact that ALP growth  slowed in the business sector 
after 1965,  associated  with slower growth  in mining  and a large  decline in construction 
productivity.  The rest of the economy  had  no slowdown  prior  to 1973.  See table  5 below. Martin Neil Baily, Robert J. Gordon  361 
Table 4.  Average Annual Growth in GDP per Hour, Major Sectors of the U.S. 
Economy, 1948-87,  Selected Periods 




Sector  1948-73  1973-79  1979-87  1973-87  1973-87 
Business  2.88  0.63  1.36  1.05  -  1.83 
Goods-producing  industries  3.21  0.55  2.39  1.60  -  1.61 
Farming  4.64  3.09  6.86  5.22  0.58 
Mining  4.02  -7.05  2.34  -  1.79  -5.81 
Construction  0.58  -  1.99  -  1.67  -  1.80  -  2.38 
Manufacturing  2.87  1.43  3.49  2.61  -  0.26 
Durable goods  excluding 
nonelectrical  machinery  2.56  1.12  2.09  1.67  -  0.89 
Nonelectrical  machinerya  2.03  0.70  11.54  6.76  4.73 
Nondurable  goods  3.40  1.90  2.13  2.03  -  1.37 
Non-goods-producing  industries  2.49  0.73  0.66  0.69  -  1.80 
Transportation  2.31  1.06  -  0.50  0.17  -  2.14 
Communications  5.22  4.25  5.09  4.73  -  0.49 
Electricity,  gas,  and sanitary 
services  5.87  0.05  1.44  0.84  -  5.03 
Trade  2.74  0.76  1.68  1.28  -  1.46 
Wholesale  3.14  0.10  2.39  1.40  -  1.74 
Retail  2.40  0.87  1.21  1.06  -  1.34 
Finance,  insurance,  and real 
estate  1.44  0.28  -  1.15  -0.54  -  1.98 
Business and personal services  2.17  0.34  0.36  0.35  -  1.82 
Government  enterprises  -0.15  0.94  -0.15  0.32  0.47 
General governmenta  0.21  -  0.28  0.37  0.09  -  0.12 
Nonprofit organizationsb  0.31  -  0.88  -  0.32  -  0.56  -  0.87 
Employment in private householdsc  -  0.35  -  0.63  1.98  0.85  1.20 
Rental value of owner-occupied 
housing  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Sources:  Hours and GDP from Bureau of Labor Statistics  data except  as noted. 
n.a.  Not  available. 
a.  GDP and hours for  1948, 1973, and 1979 from NIPA;  for  1987 from Slurvey of Current Blusiniess, vol.  68 (July 
1988). 
b.  GDP from NIPA  and Survey of Currenit  Busitness. Hours from Survey of Currenit  Blusiness and BLS estimates 
of military hours. 
c.  GDP from NIPA  and Survey of Clurrent  Business.  Hours from BLS. 
business sector was widespread, a point illustrated  more vividly by 
figure  1.  All  the  industries  except  agriculture  and  nonelectrical  machinery 
experienced slower growth post-1973 than pre-1973. The ubiquitous 
nature  of the slowdown strongly  suggests that the slowdown  is real and 
not  just the product  of measurement  errors.  Sectors where productivity 
is relatively  well measured, such as mining, utilities, and nondurable 362  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1988 
Figure 1.  Change in Labor Productivity Growth, 1948-73 to 1973-87,  by Industry 
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manufacturing,  all experienced slowdowns. The slowdown in goods- 
producing  and  non-goods-producing  industries  was about  the same. The 
industries with questionable real output data, such as construction, 
transportation,  FIRE, and services, have somewhat  larger  slowdowns 
than average, but smaller than mining and utilities. Thus in the next 
section when we eliminate  the poorly  measured  industries  and  keep only 
the well-measured  ones, the slowdown  is still clearly  visible. 
At first  glance,  the industry  productivity  data  suggest  that  the increase 
in energy prices in 1973 had an effect on productivity. Mining and 
utilities,  two of the industries  most heavily affected  by the energy  crisis, 
had  the biggest  post-1973  slowdowns. Transportation,  too, had a major 
slowdown. On closer inspection, however, the impact  of energy is not 
so clear. Both mining  and  utilities  had  begun  to slow down before 1973. 
The depletion  of easily available  oil reserves in oil extraction,  health  and 
safety regulation  in coal mining, and the depletion of innovation and 
returns-to-scale  opportunities  in electric  power, together  with the effect 
of environmental  regulations,  were reducing  growth  before the energy 
crisis hit.  I  I  In the transportation  sector, too, the timing  seems a little  off. 
11. On  oil reserves, see William  D. Nordhaus,  The Efficient Use of Energy Resources 
(Yale  University  Press, 1979);  and  Nordhaus,  "Oil  and  Economic  Performance  in  Industrial 
Countries,"  BPEA,  2:1980,  pp. 341-400. On electric  power, see Robert  J. Gordon,  "The Martin Neil Baily, Robert J. Gordon  363 
This sector slowed less after 1973  than it did after 1979,  a period when 
energy  prices began  to come down.  12  So on closer examination,  the fact 
that energy-intensive  sectors had post-1973 slowdowns provides less 
compelling  evidence than  seemed at first. 
Table  4 indicates  that  growth  did  make  a partial  recovery  during  1979- 
87. Growth  was substantially  faster after 1979  than during 1973-79 in 
many of the major  sectors of the economy, particularly  in the goods- 
producing  industries.  And because the two industries  where the slow- 
down  intensified  after  1979  were transportation  and  FIRE,  both  of which 
have measurement  problems, it is possible that the partial  recovery of 
measured  growth after 1979 might be understated  in the official data 
because of unmeasured  output  gains. 
THE  EFFECT  OF  REMOVING  THE  PROBLEM  CHILDREN 
One way to show how much effect there has been from industries 
with measurement  problems  is to remove their value added and hours 
from  the  total-exactly  what  is done  already  when  government,  nonprofit 
organizations,  and  owner-occupied  housing  are  removed.  Table  5 shows 
the effect of removing  the problem or controversial  industries, either 
singly  or in combination.3  Regardless  of which industries  are removed, 
the existence of a post-1973  slowdown remains  clear, and the 1973-79 
period was one of strikingly  weak growth. In other ways, however, 
removing  these industries  makes  a big difference. 
One such difference  is revealed  by separating  out the period 1965-73, 
for which the removal of the construction industry has an important 
Productivity  Slowdown  in the Steam-Electric  Generating  Industry"  (Northwestern  Uni- 
versity,  February  1983);  Paul  L. Joskow  and  Nancy  L. Rose, "The  Effects  of Technological 
Change,  Experience,  and Environmental  Regulation  on the Construction  Cost of Coal- 
burning  Generating  Units," Rand  Journal  of Economics,  vol. 16, no. 1 (Spring  1985),  pp. 
1-27; and Martin  N. Baily and Alok K. Chakrabarti,  Innovation  and the Productivity 
Crisis  (Brookings,  1988),  pp. 67-85. 
12. The statement  in the text is based  on the NIPA data  compiled  by the BEA. As we 
show in our case study  below, much  of the measured  slowdown  in NIPA transportation 
productivity  is fictitious.  While  trucking  is still  a problem,  reflecting  the 55-mile  speed  limit 
and  end of the one-time  effect of building  of the interstate  highway  system, productivity 
growth  in railroads  and airlines  has been buoyant.  We show that ALP in both railroads 
and  airlines  more  than  doubled  during  1967-86,  even with no allowance  for the effects of 
computers  on the quality  of output. 
13. The first  number  in the first  column  of table  5 is the famous  figure  of 3.2 percent, 
the basis  of the Kennedy-Johnson  anti-inflation  "guideposts."  After  two decades  of data 
revisions,  this number  is still  inviolate. 364  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1988 
Table 5.  Real Business Sector Labor Productivity Growth Omitting Selected Industries, 
1947-87,  Selected Periods 




Itemn  1948-65  1965-73 1973-79 1979-87 1948-73 1973-87 1973-87 
Business  totala  3.23  2.06  0.64  1.30  2.85  1.02  -1.83 
Less: Services  3.35  2.13  0.78  1.65  2.96  1.28  -1.68 
FIRE  3.27  2.08  0.60  1.50  2.89  1.12  -1.77 
Construction  3.19  2.70  0.86  1.51  3.03  1.23  -1.80 
Transportation  3.34  2.03  0.62  1.40  2.92  1.07  -1.85 
Nonelectrical 
machinery  3.26  2.05  0.64  0.94  2.88  0.81  - 2.07 
Services and FIRE  3.41  2.15  0.72  1.93  3.00  1.41  -1.59 
Services, FIRE, con- 
struction, and trans- 
portation  3.54  2.99  0.99  2.51  3.37  1.86  -1.51 
All of above  3.61  3.02  1.00  1.97  3.42  1.55  -1.87 
Sources:  Nonelectrical  machinery  for  1948,  1965,  1973, and  1979 taken  from  NIPA;  for  1987, from  Survey  of 
Cuirretnt Buisiniess,  vol.  68 (July 1988). All other figures taken from BLS  data. 
a.  Built up from industry data by authors. 
effect on the pattern  of productivity  for the business sector as a whole. 
Over  this interval,  output  per hour  in the total business sector rose 1.17 
percent a year more slowly than in the pre-1965 period. Removing 
construction  reduces  this  relative  slowdown  more  than  half, to only 0.49 
percent a year. By contrast  the white-collar  industries  have their most 
important  impact  after 1979.  Removing  the white-collar  sectors of FIRE 
and services lifts output  per hour to almost 2 percent in the remaining 
sectors of the business economy. If the other problem industries of 
construction  and transportation  are removed, the slow growth in the 
remaining  industries  looks like only a temporary  problem,  with a growth 
rate of 2.51 percent during 1979-87-a  rate that is within shouting 
distance  of the 1948-73  average  of 3.37 percent. 
The calculations  reported  in table 5 should be evaluated  cautiously, 
because the industries  we are  omitting,  particularly  services, FIRE, and 
transportation,  produce  part  of their  output  for intermediate  use. Con- 
struction  and  nonelectrical  machinery  produce  primarily  for  final  output. 
If services, FIRE, and transportation  have had real productivity  prob- 
lems, then the table indicates the impact of these on the aggregate.  If 
they have had  only measurement  problems,  then the impact  of these on 
aggregate  productivity  is less than  is indicated  in table  5. Martin Neil Baily, Robert J. Gordon  365 
IS  MANUFACTURING  GROWTH  BEING  OVERSTATED? 
The potential errors in the allocation of total GDP by industry to 
which  we have  pointed  have led Edward  Denison  to question  the validity 
of productivity  analysis by industry.  14  He argues that the allocation  of 
output by industry  is so fraught  with error that industry  productivity 
measures  are unreliable  and should  be supplemented  by estimates that 
allocate  inputs  by sectors of final  demand.  Without  prejudging  his input 
allocation  proposal, we believe that he exaggerates  the problems  with 
industry  productivity  measures, which, despite their failings, provide 
essential  tools for analysis  and  can suggest  areas  where  there  is mismea- 
surement  with aggregate  implications.  Denison also argues that there 
has been a specific bias in recent years, namely, that manufacturing 
output and productivity  have been overstated and nonfarm  nonmanu- 
facturing  understated.  He gives two main  reasons  for his view. The first 
is that there has been a normal  historical  relation  between productivity 
growth in manufacturing  and nonmanufacturing,  so that the sudden 
opening up of a large gap in their growth rates seems suspicious. The 
second reason involves the effects of the new computer  price index, 
which we discuss in conjunction  with capital  input  measurement  issues 
later  on. 
Denison is not alone in suggesting  an overstatement  of the growth  in 
manufacturing  output.  A recent study  by Lawrence  Mishel  has claimed 
that  both  current-  and  constant-dollar  shares  of the manufacturing  sector 
have been misestimated.15  Mishel's first argument  is that BEA cooked 
the books to make the manufacturing  share of output constant by 
introducing  a "fudge  factor" that lowered manufacturing  output  about 
$55 billion (1982  dollars)  in 1973  and by lesser amounts  in other years. 
The fudge factor  was almost zero by 1979,  so it had the effect of raising 
the rate of growth  of output  during  1973-79  and helping  keep constant 
the manufacturing  share  over the period.  Second, Mishel  points  out that 
from 1979  to 1985  the BEA data  indicate  that  the ratio  of manufacturing 
gross  output  to purchased  inputs  rose dramatically,  marking  a sharp  shift 
14. Edward  F. Denison,  Estimates of Productivity Change by Industry: An Evaluation 
and an Alternative (Brookings,  forthcoming). 
15. Lawrence  R. Mishel,  Manufacturing Numbers: How Inaccurate Statistics Conceal 
U.S. Industrial Decline (Washington,  D.C.: Economic  Policy Institute,  April  1988). 366  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1988 
in the earlier trend. Mishel argues that this change is implausible, 
particularly  because the 1979-85 period was one of a rising dollar and 
widespread  reports  of increases in outsourcing  by manufacturing  com- 
panies. He points  out that  BEA has used only domestic  price  indexes to 
deflate  purchased  intermediate  goods, ignoring  the likely declines in the 
prices of imported  components.  He concludes that  the growth  of manu- 
facturing  value added  has been overstated  for 1979-85,  although  he does 
not have a figure  for the alleged  error  over that  interval.  If manufacturing 
productivity  were measured  in accord  with Mishel's argument,  it would 
change the picture considerably. Removing BEA's adjustment  factor 
would lower the 1973-79 productivity growth rate in manufacturing 
almost to zero. Mishel's 1979-85  argument  would result in a reduction 
in the post-1979  recovery of manufacturing  productivity. 
BEA has responded  to the criticisms  by Denison and Mishel.  16 They 
argue  that  ad hoc adjustments  are essential given the weaknesses of the 
data  on income  by industry  and  the need to match  total  income  with total 
expenditure.  When  the NIPA were rebased  to 1982,  a large  discrepancy 
was found between real GDP by commodity  and real GDP calculated 
from  the total of income originating  by industry  in 1972  and 1973.  Since 
the commodity  data  are the more  reliable,  BEA scaled  back  the industry 
data, leading  to the downward  adjustment  of manufacturing  output, by 
about 8.7 percent in 1972,  8.8 percent in 1973,  and by smaller  amounts 
in other years. Looking at the productivity  data supports  the need for 
adjustment.  Without  the 1973  adjustment,  productivity  growth  in man- 
ufacturing  would have been 3.77 percent  a year during  1965-73  and  0.11 
percent a year during  1973-79.  This is possible, but unlikely.  17 When  it 
comes to the post-1979  recovery, Mishel's  argument  is much  more  solid. 
16. Department  of Commerce,  Bureau  of Economic Analysis, "Gross Product  by 
Industry:  Comments  on Recent Criticisms,"  Survey  of Current Business, vol. 68 (July 
1988),  pp. 132-33.  The  comments  were  prepared  by Frank  deLeeuw  and  Robert  P. Parker. 
17. Michael Darby has suggested that an important  explanation  of the  1973-79 
slowdown  was that 1971-73  real  output  growth  was being  overstated  and 1973-79  output 
growth understated  because of price controls. Darby argues that the price controls 
encouraged  companies  to downgrade  product  quality,  or at least the quality  associated 
with a particular  product  category,  leading  to an upward  bias in real  output  during  1971- 
73 and  a downward  bias  during  1974-75  as controls  were  removed  and  companies  restored 
the old levels of quality. See Michael  R. Darby, "The U.S. Productivity  Slowdown:  A 
Case of Statistical  Myopia,"  American  Economic  Review, vol. 74 (June 1984),  pp. 301- 
22. Both of the present  authors  have been skeptical  of Darby's  argument,  for different 
reasons. For Baily's view, see "A Comment  on Michael  Darby's Explanation  of U.S. 
Productivity  Growth"  (Brookings,  June  29, 1984).  Gordon's  study  of durable  goods prices Martin Neil Baily, Robert J. Gordon  367 
BEA concedes  that  the  absence  of an  import  price  deflator  has  introduced 
bias into manufacturing  value added. We predict  that future  data revi- 
sions will show somewhat  slower  growth  of manufacturing  productivity 
during  1979-85. 
BEA follows the approach,  which we also recommend,  that consis- 
tency among  data sources provides  an important  check on errors.  They 
note that  according  to an independent  Census  Bureau  estimate,  current- 
dollar  value added in manufacturing  grew at 4.7 percent a year during 
1972-85, compared with 4.3 percent a year for current-dollar  gross 
product. And the Federal Reserve Board's index of manufacturing 
industrial  production  grew 3.0 percent a year over the same period, 
compared  with 2.7 percent  for constant-dollar  gross product. 
BEA does concede that the consistency check is not as close for the 
pre- and post-1979  subperiods.  The alternative  data sources indicate a 
little more growth before 1979  and a little less during 1979-85. These 
estimates  are consistent  with the Mishel  complaint  about  import  prices, 
but not his complaint  about the 1972  and 1973  adjustments.  When the 
dust settles on this issue it is unlikely that the post-1979  recovery of 
growth  in manufacturing  will be eliminated.  If the overvalued  dollar is 
the source of the manufacturing  revival, then the revival should be 
reversing itself because the dollar has declined. Preliminary  data for 
1987  and 1988 indicate that the recovery of growth in productivity  in 
manufacturing  is continuing. 
Mix Effects 
The movement  of aggregate  productivity  is not equal to the average 
of the movements of the individual  industries. The use of aggregate 
series  can provide  a misleading  view of underlying  trends,  because there 
is an aggregation  or mix effect. Table 6 shows the shares of the main 
components  of the business sector in output and hours of labor input. 
described  below collected annual  data from the Sears catalog  for 68 different  products, 
with multiple  models for many products,  and controlled  for every quality  characteristic 
listed  in the Sears  printed  specification.  When  these Sears  prices  were  compared  product- 
by-product  with the detailed  PPIs  for the same goods, there was no change  in the Sears- 
PPI  ratio  evident  in the period  1971-73,  indicating  that  any quality  deterioration  must  have 
been  heavily  disguised  or, more  probably,  nonexistent.  We  find  it  likely  that  microeconomic 
adjustment  costs impede  rapid  changes  in product  quality  either  up or down in response 
to temporary  pricing  distortions. 368  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1988 
Table 6.  Real Output and Labor Shares and Relative Productivities,  1948-87,  Various 
Years 
Percent  except as noted 
Industry  1948  1973  1979  1987 
Share of total output 
Farm  5.1  2.3  2.2  2.4 
Mining  8.2  6.3  5.3  3.9 
Construction  10.2  8.0  7.0  5.8 
Manufacturing  27.1  29.2  28.2  27.6 
Transportation  8.7  5.5  5.6  4.5 
Communications  1.0  2.4  2.9  3.5 
Utilities  1.5  3.5  3.4  3.5 
Trade  18.4  20.5  20.7  21.7 
FIRE  8.8  10.2  11.1  10.9 
Services  10.6  12.1  13.7  16.4 
Share of total hours 
Farm  18.4  5.5  4.5  3.3 
Mining  1.9  1.1  1.5  1.0 
Construction  5.1  7.1  7.3  7.6 
Manufacturing  29.1  32.0  29.6  24.7 
Transportation  6.3  4.6  4.5  4.2 
Communications  1.4  1.8  1.8  1.6 
Utilities  1.0  1.2  1.2  1.2 
Trade  22.4  26.0  26.0  26.5 
FIRE  3.7  6.1  6.8  8.1 
Services  10.8  14.7  16.9  21.8 
Relative labor  productivitya 
Farm  0.28  0.42  0.49  0.75 
Mining  4.42  5.80  3.61  3.89 
Construction  2.00  1.13  0.97  0.76 
Manufacturing  0.93  0.91  0.95  1.12 
Transportation  1.38  1.20  1.23  1.06 
Communications  0.75  1.32  1.63  2.18 
Utilities  1.45  2.97  2.87  2.89 
Trade  0.82  0.79  0.80  0.82 
FIRE  2.37  1.66  1.63  1.33 
Services  0.99  0.83  0.81  0.75 
Source:  BLS  data. 
a.  Share of total output divided by share of total hours. 
Farming, mining, and construction have declined in importance as 
proportions  of goods output, although  construction  has maintained  its 
share of hours. Most of the non-goods-producing  industries have in- 
creased their shares of business sector output, with transportation  as 
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To estimate  the importance  of mix effects during  the postwar  years, 
we use William  Nordhaus's method of decomposing  aggregate  growth 
into the weighted average of the rates of growth in the individual 
industries  plus a mix effect (see table 7). The results  for the early years 
are familiar.  The shift of workers  off the farm, important  early on, had 
ended by 1973.  The results of the post-1973  mix effect calculations  are 
new, however. During  1973-79  the mix effect from the nonfarm  sector 
actually  boosted aggregate  productivity  growth,  but during  1979-87  mix 
effects reduced  growth. These results strengthen  the idea that produc- 
tivity growth has made a partial recovery. The fixed-weight  average 
productivity  growth rate increased 1.2 percentage points after 1979, 
compared  with only a 0.7 point speed-up  in the official  data. 
The findings  are generated  largely  by the fact that ALP in mining  is 
several times as large as the average  for all industries.  The increase in 
energy-prices  in 1973  brought  workers  into the industry,  and  the decline 
in prices in the 1980s  pushed them out again. The mining  sector alone 
accounts for 0.23 out of a positive mix effect of 0.26 during 1973-79. 
This sector accounts for - 0.14 out of a negative mix effect of - 0.25 
during  1979-86.  A secondary  effect is that the growth  of employment  in 
services has had a negative impact on growth: -0.06  during 1973-79 
and -0.13  during 1979-87. However, the growth of employment in 
finance, insurance,  and real estate had a positive mix effect on overall 
growth,  adding  0.08 in both of the two post-1973  periods.'8 
Recapitulation  and Preview 
This completes the first  third  of the paper,  our broad-brush  introduc- 
tion to  the aggregate and industry-level productivity measures, as 
18. In earlier  work  Baily argued  that  decomposing  aggregate  multifactor  productivity 
growth  rather  than labor productivity  growth  was more consistent with the model of a 
market  allocation of factors of production. The results of this MFP decomposition 
calculated  through  1986,  using  MFP  by industry  from  the American  Productivity  Center, 
confirm  what  we have  just reported.  Fixed-weight  MFP  growth  also increases  by about  a 
percentage  point  after 1979.  That  itself is a striking  finding,  because  the MFP  calculations 
in table  1  made  by the BLS indicate  that  the 1979-86  recovery  of MFP  growth  is only about 
half  as large  as the recovery  of labor  productivity  growth.  Thus  the mix effects are found 
to be more important  when calculated  from MFP. Martin  N. Baily, "The Productivity 
Growth  Slowdown  by Industry,"  BPEA,  2:1982,  pp. 423-59. 370  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1988 
Table 7.  Decomposition of Labor Productivity Growth, Business Sector, 1948-87, 
Selected Periods 
Percent  per year 
Fixed-weight  Businiess  sec- 
average  pro-  Effects of  Industiy  mix  Industry  mnix  tor total pro- 
ductivity  chaniges in  effects,  effects,  ton-  ductivity 
Period  growth  output  shares  far-m  farmn  growtha 
1948-53  3.01  -0.00  0.65  -0.09  3.58 
1953-65  2.81  - 0.04  0.31  -0.07  3.01 
1965-73  2.09  -0.27  0.22  -0.00  2.04 
1973-79  0.38  -0.09  0.09  0.26  0.64 
1979-87  1.53  - 0.04  0.06  - 0.25  1.29 
1948-73  2.62  -0.11  0.35  -0.05  2.81 
1973-87  1.04  -0.06  0.07  - 0.03  1.01 
Change,  1948-73 
to 1973-87  -  1.58  0.05  -0.28  0.02  -  1.80 
Source:  Hours and output  taken  from  BLS data. For further  information  regarding  decomposition  of aggregate 
growth,  see Martin  N. Baily, "The Productivity  Growth  Slowdown  by Industry,"  BPEA, 2:1982,  pp. 423-59. 
a. Equals  the sum  of fixed-weight  average  productivity  growth  and mix effects. 
compiled by the official agencies.  We turn now to the measurement  of 
input, both labor and capital. After reviewing recent work by others on 
labor  quality,  we  address  conceptual  issues  in  the  measurement  of 
producers'  durable goods,  which matter both as output and as capital 
input.  Here  we  assess  the  current  debate  on  the  measurement  of 
computer prices in the official data. We shall find that quality change in 
capital goods involves  many products beyond computers that have not 
been treated adequately in the NIPA,  and we examine the implications 
of improved price indexes for these products. 
Measuring  Labor  Input 
The use of labor hours as labor input represents a potential source of 
mismeasurement.  There is tremendous heterogeneity  in the labor force, 
and changes  over time in the age,  sex,  or educational mix of the work 
force change the average quality of labor hours. In addition, the growth 
slowdown  and the U.S.  problems with competitiveness  have raised the 
suspicion that the quality of the U.S.  work force has declined. Although 
up to now most research has indicated that trends in labor-force quality 
have not significantly affected productivity trends, some, though not all, Martin Neil Baily, Robert J. Gordon  371 
new research suggests a serious decline in labor quality, so it is worth 
updating  this issue.  19 
Denison finds  little difference  in the post-1973  shift in trend  between 
the  raw  total  of hours  and  the adjusted  index  of labor  input.  He constructs 
an index of labor input after adjusting  hours worked for the effect of 
changes in the age-sex composition of the work force, the amount of 
education,  and an adjustment  resulting  from  differences  in work-weeks 
by type of person and occupation. The top panel of table 8 shows the 
results  of Denison's adjustments,  which  imply  that  labor  input  has  grown 
substantially  faster than  total hours over the postwar  period  as a result 
of increases in education, and that the effect of education has been 
remarkably  stable over the full period 1948-82. Changes  in the age-sex 
mix of the population  have had  a negative  impact  on growth  during  1948- 
82, with this impact intensifying  slightly after 1973. Denison explains 
about  0.1 percent  a year of slowdown  with his labor  quality  adjustment. 
Dale  Jorgenson,  Frank  Gollop,  and  Barbara  Fraumeni  follow Denison 
in constructing  an index of labor input in which the relative wages of 
individuals  are taken as indicative of relative productivities  but differ 
from Denison in making a much finer breakdown  of the work force 
(81,600 cross-classifications)  and in using the Tornqvist  index number 
approach.20  In their  calculations,  the total change  in labor-force  quality 
reflects not only the partial  effects of sex, age, education,  employment 
class, and  occupation,  but  also the interactions  among  them.  This  means 
that the sum of the partial  effects is not equal to the total effect. The 
middle  panel of table 8 gives a summary  of some of their  results, which 
differ importantly  from Denison's. Jorgenson and his colleagues find 
that  all of their  five elements of labor  quality  turned  adverse  after 1973. 
Labor  quality  contributed  0.72 to labor  input  growth  prior  to 1973,  but 
19.  Denison,  Trends in American Economic  Growth; Dale Jorgenson,  Frank Gollop, 
and Barbara Fraumeni, Productivity  and  U.S.  Economic  Growth (Harvard University 
Press, 1987);  Edwin Dean, Kent Kunze, and Larry  Rosenblum,  "Productivity  Change 
and  the  Measurement  of Heterogeneous  Labor  Inputs,"  paper  presented  at  the  Conference 
on New Measurement  Procedures  for U.S. Agricultural  Productivity,  March  31-April 1, 
1988,  Washington,  D.C. 
20. The breakdown  into 81,600  boxes includes  a breakdown  by industry.  The effects 
of industry  shifts are not counted  as part  of the labor  quality  adjustment,  however. The 
industry  shifts  are  treated  separately  in their  analysis.  Their  approach  has been criticized, 
because  the underlying  wage data  are not sufficiently  detailed  to support  a breakdown  as 
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Table 8.  Alternative Adjustments for Labor Quality,  1948-86,  Selected Periods 
Percent change per year 
Denison: Nonresidential business (potential) 
Total  Adjustment  Adjusted 
weekly  Group  labor 
Period  hours  Age-sex  Education  shifts  inputa 
1948-73  0.73  -  0.24  0.64  0.21  1.34 
1973-82  2.02  -  0.38  0.69  0.19  2.54 
Change  1.29  -  0.14  0.05  -0.02  1.20 
Jorgenson: Whole economy 
Adjustmentb 
Employment  Adjusted 
Total  classifica-  Occupa-  labor 
Period  hours  Sex  Age  Education  tion  tion  inputa 
1948-73  1.01  -0.19  -  0.07  0.66  0.17  0.37  1.73 
1973-79  1.62  -0.54  -0.34  0.36  -  0.22  0.00  1.72 
Change  0.61  -0.35  -  0.27  -0.30  -0.39  -0.37  -  0.01 
BLS team: Private business sector 
Quality  Adjusted 
Total  index  labor 
Period  hours  adjustment  inputa 
1948-73  0.68  0.28  0.96 
1973-86  1.44  0.30  1.74 
Change  0.76  0.02  0.78 
Sources:  Edward F.  Denison,  Trends in American Economic  Growth, 1929-82  (Brookings,  1985), table 3-4; Dale 
Jorgenson,  Frank  Gollop,  and  Barbara Fraumeni,  Productivity  and  U.S.  Econiomnic  Growth (Harvard  University 
Press,  1987), tables  8.1 and 8.6; Edward Dean,  Kent Kunze,  and Larry Rosenblum,  "Productivity  Change and the 
Measurement of Heterogeneous  Labor Inputs,"  paper presented at the Conference  on New  Measurement Procedures 
for  U.S.  Agricultural  Productivity,  March  31-April  1,  1988,  Washington,  D.C.  Total  hours  taken  from  BLS, 
"Multifactor Productivity  Measures  1986." 
a.  Sum of total or total weekly  hours and quality adjustments. 
b.  Adjustments  interact so that their total effect  is not simply their sum. 
only 0.10 after 1973.  According  to Jorgenson  and his colleagues, labor 
quality  accounts  for a slowdown  of 0.62 in labor  productivity  growth. 
Edwin Dean, Kent Kunze, and Larry Rosenblum of BLS use an 
approach  different  from either Denison's or Jorgenson's. They argue 
that the relative wages of individuals may reflect factors other than 
relative  productivities.  They run regressions  to determine  the effect of 
experience (not age) and education on wages and use the estimated 
coefficients to determine  the extent to which a change in the overall Martin Neil Baily, Robert J. Gordon  373 
levels of experience  and  education  have changed  the quality  of the labor 
input. Other  variables  are controlled  for in the regressions  but do not 
contribute  to the estimate  of labor  quality  change.21 The results  on labor 
quality  are shown in the bottom part  of table 8. The BLS group  makes 
smaller  adjustments  than Denison does and concludes that there was 
virtually  no reduction  in the rate of quality  augmentation  over time. 
What should we make of these differences?  The BLS group makes 
smaller  labor quality  adjustments  than Denison, because it argues that 
only part of wage differentials  translates  into productivity  effects, but 
the differences  are sufficiently  minor  to lead both Denison and the BLS 
group to conclude that labor quality adjustments  contribute little to 
understanding  the productivity  slowdown. In assessing the Jorgenson 
results,  we stress  first  that  they apply  to only half  the time  period  covered 
by the BLS group. The slowdown in the growth of female labor-force 
participation  in the 1980s  and  the declining  share  of teenagers  guarantees 
that an extension of the Jorgenson  results to 1986 would yield much 
smaller age-sex effects. As for the general Jorgenson approach, its 
advantage  is that its rigorous  basis in production  theory means that its 
estimate of technical change or the productivity  residual  can be inter- 
preted cleanly as the shift factor in an aggregate  production  function. 
But one can argue that changes in occupation and employment  class 
reflect, at least in part, changes of the economic system rather than 
changes in intrinsic  labor quality. This is part of the old debate about 
whether  productivity  adheres  to the  job or the person; ask any woman 
who has escaped  from  low wages and  occupational  crowding  in, say, the 
textile industry  to take ajob nearby  in durable  goods manufacturing. 
The most puzzling difference between Denison and Jorgenson in- 
volves the effect of education.  The most likely explanation  is that  when 
Jorgenson  and  his colleagues  use Tornqvist  index numbers  with current 
period  weights, they pick up the decline in the return to education  that 
took place in the 1970s.22  We are dubious  of an approach  that  interprets 
a reduction  in the return  to higher  education  resulting  from a change in 
the balance  of supply  and demand  as a decline in the quality  of existing 
college-educated  workers. After all, we would not want to count an 
21. These other variables are geographical  region, full-time or part-time,  veteran 
status,  and  residence  in a central  city. Different  regressions  are run  by sex, so that  wage 
differences  by sex are  assumed  to reflect  productivity  differences. 
22. Richard  B. Freeman,  The  Overeducated  American  (Academic  Press, 1976). 374  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1988 
existing Boeing 747 as less capital as a result of a decline in airline 
profitability  that  may well be temporary.  It would be a mistake,  then, to 
interpret  Jorgenson's  findings  as saying that there was a decline in the 
rate of accumulation  of human  capital  over the period,  when accumula- 
tion  is measured  by increased  years  or days a year  of schooling.  Denison 
and the BLS study show that this was not the case. Further,  we know 
that there has been a sharp revival in the return to education in the 
1980s.23  The Jorgenson  approach  will doubtless show much less differ- 
ence between total hours and effective labor input when extended 
forward  in time. 
TEST  SCORES  AND  LABOR  QUALITY 
One possible explanation  of the decline in the return  to education  in 
the 1970s  is that  the "quality"  of a year of schooling  may  have declined, 
perhaps because students were not learning as much. An important 
observation that fueled concern about the size of the payoff from 
economywide  increases  in years  of schooling  was the decline  in scholas- 
tic aptitude  test (SAT) scores that began in the 1960s. The extent to 
which declining test scores are an important  part of the productivity 
story is controversial. We have been told by different  people whose 
judgment  we respect  that, on the one hand,  this issue is a key one for the 
slowdown and, on the other hand, that the test score evidence is 
meaningless.  It is worth  taking  a look. 
In earlier  work, Baily considered  whether  the decline in SAT scores 
could have been an important  cause of the post-1973  growth  decline.24 
He concluded  that it could not have been, because the decline was not 
large enough, and the new entrants  to the labor force with the lower 
scores did not make up a large enough fraction of the work force. A 
recent study by John  Bishop has investigated  not only SAT scores, but 
a variety of different measures of general intellectual achievement 
(GIA).25  He considers one important  set of tests that has been given to 
23. Frank  Levy, "Incomes, Families, and Living Standards,"  in Robert E. Litan, 
Robert  Z. Lawrence,  and  Charles  L. Schultze,  eds., American  Living  Standards:  Threats 
and Challenges (Brookings,  1988). 
24. Martin  N. Baily, "Productivity  and the Services of Capital  and Labor,"  BPEA, 
1:1981, pp. 1-50. 
25. John  Bishop, "Is the Test Score  Decline  Responsible  for the Productivity  Growth 
Decline?"  Working  Paper  87-05 (Cornell  University,  January  6, 1988). Martin Neil Baily, Robert J. Gordon  375 
students  in Iowa on a fairly uniform  basis over many years, as well as 
others, for example  those given by the armed  forces. All the tests show 
that  there  has been a long-term  trend  of rising  scores, which  accelerated 
in the mid-1950s.  The scores flattened  out in the mid-1960s  and  declined 
in the 1970s. 
Bishop  uses a wage  equation  to estimate  the impact  of GIA  on earnings 
in  the cross section  and  then  applies  his coefficient  estimate  to determine 
the impact  of the test score decline. His findings  confirm  that  the decline 
in scores after 1967  did not cause the post-1973  slowdown. In fact, the 
upward  burst  of scores in the 1960s  meant  that  average  GIA  for the work 
force was rising  faster than trend  during  part of the slowdown period. 
Bishop does  suggest, however, that the test  score decline is  now 
contributing  to weak  growth  in the 1980s.  He estimates  that  labor  quality 
was reduced by 0.24 percent a year during 1980-87 as a result of the 
reduction  in GIA. 
While  this figure  is based  upon  his wage equation,  Bishop obtains  the 
0.24 figure  by scaling  up his regression  estimate  with an adjustment  for 
errors in variables. This scaling-up  can be questioned. Certainly  the 
regression estimate of the coefficient on GIA is likely to be biased 
downward  relative  to the true  coefficient, because his proxy for GIA in 
the cross-sectional  data  is only a weak one. But estimating  the impact  of 
trends  in GIA on labor  quality  using the scaled-up  coefficient  is correct 
only if the true  trend  in GIA  is known. Since the time series trend  in test 
scores is itself only a proxy, albeit  a much  better  one, the adjustment  to 
the regression  coefficient  may  be too great.26  The observed  trends  in test 
scores may reflect the emphasis the schools put on test score perfor- 
mance,  rather  than  trends  in underlying  achievement.  Schools stressed 
test scores in the post-Sputnik  era and have started  doing so again in 
recent  years. 
Overall,  therefore,  we accept the idea  that  GIA  has grown  less rapidly 
since 1973  than  before, but a figure  of 0.1 percent a year is a reasonable 
estimate  of the magnitude  of the decline in the quality  of the work  force 
26. Daniel M. Koretz has recently reviewed the trends in test scores and their 
implications  in  a study  for  the Congressional  Budget  Office.  He argues  that  the educational 
community  is so diverse that the changing  trends  could not reflect  anything  different  in 
what  the schools  were doing.  We disagree.  There  certainly  was a general  change  in social 
attitudes  toward  testing in the 1960s, but this shift then affected what happened  in the 
schools.  Congressional  Budget  Office,  Educational  Achievement:  Explanations  and 
Implications of Recent Trends (Government Printing Office, August 1987). 376  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1988 
that is additional to the adjustments Denison  makes for the quantity of 
education and other labor-force changes.  Thus adding 0.1 point decline 
to Denison's  0.09 point decline  in adjusted labor input relative to total 
hours, from table 8, would yield roughly a 0.2 point contribution of labor 
quality measurement to the post- 1973 slowdown. 
Issues in the Measurement  of Output and Capital Input 
The vast  literature on output and input measurement  is filled with 
disputes,  some  but not  all of  which  have  been  cleared  up in recent 
years.27 We  focus  on  the  central  measurement  issues  related  to  the 
productivity slowdown.  At the most general level,  there is an inevitable 
arbitrariness in the extent to which our measure of final output represents 
a broad  measure  of  "welfare"  or  a  narrower  measure  of  currently 
produced physical output sold on the market. 
Denison  and others have recognized  that no single generally accept- 
able measure of welfare can be constructed.28  There is no straightforward 
way  to measure the welfare  cost  of increased  crime,  congestion,  and 
pollution of the air and water, nor the welfare benefit of improved medical 
care and of completely  new products like the automobile, air condition- 
ing,  and home  computers.  And  how  are we  to  compare  the  present 
danger of nuclear war with past hazards, some of which are recalled by 
Denison in a memorable passage: 
Who would now think  to consider the danger  of attack  by hostile Indians?  Or 
the risk of being doused by slops thrown  from windows as he walks the city 
streets? Even the very recent elimination  of refrigerator  doors that cannot be 
opened  from  within,  and  cost the lives of so many  children,  is almost  forgotten. 
The annual series for "persons lynched" appears in the Census Bureau's 
Historical Statistics  but not in its current Statistical Abstract.29 
27. Basic  references  include  Franklin  M. Fisher  and  Karl  Shell, The  Economic  Theory 
of Price Indices (New York and London: Academic Press, 1972);  Panel to Review 
Productivity  Statistics,  Measurement  and Interpretation  of Productivity  (Washington, 
D.C.: National  Academy  of Sciences, 1979);  and  Jack E. Triplett,  "Concepts  of Quality 
in Input and Output  Price Measures:  A Resolution of the User-Value  Resource-Cost 
Debate,"  in Murray F.  Foss,  ed.,  The U.S.  National  Income  and Product  Accounts: 
Selected Topics,  Studies  in Income  and Wealth,  vol. 47 (University  of Chicago  Press  for 
NBER, 1983),  pp. 296-31  1. 
28. Edward  F. Denison, "Welfare  Measurement  and the GNP," Survey  of Current 
Business,  vol. 51 (January  1971),  p. 13. 
29. Ibid., p. 5. Martin Neil Baily, Robert J. Gordon  377 
Yet it goes too far to retreat  entirely  to a market-produced  criterion 
for output. William  Nordhaus, James Tobin, Richard  and Nancy Rug- 
gles, and Robert  Eisner have produced  estimates of some or all of the 
nonmarket  activities  that  produce  economic  welfare. For our  purposes, 
we need  to have a conceptual  framework  for  perspective  on the evolution 
of the quality  of marketed  consumer  services, some of which  reflect  new 
products made possible by the computer and other electronic capital 
goods, some of which represent substitution  for formerly nonmarket 
activities  produced  in the home, and others  of which increase "conven- 
ience."  In this section we  concentrate on issues related to quality 
improvements  in durable  goods and  defer  the discussion  of convenience 
to our  case study  of retail  trade. 
COMPUTERS  AND  OTHER  PRODUCER  DURABLES 
Durable  goods are  normally  an input  into the production  of goods and 
services consumed  by final  users. Producer  durables  are an input,  along 
with labor, structures, energy, and materials, in the production of 
consumer  and  producer  goods. Consumer  durables  may also be consid- 
ered an input,  producing  transportation  services or household  services. 
The crucial  step in developing  adequate  deflators  for durable  goods, and 
hence in assessing the computer explosion, is to recognize that final 
market  product  (Q) is produced  by a vector of market-purchased  input 
characteristics  (X): 
(2)  Q = Q(X),  Qx >  ,  Qxx  <  . 
An input  characteristic  is defined  as any attribute  of a market-purchased 
input  that  has  a positive  marginal  product,  including  in  the  case of durable 
goods the horsepower  and physical dimensions  for a truck, or memory 
size and calculations  per unit of time for a computer.  In Triplett's  more 
precise definition,  a quantity  is an input characteristic  if it reduces the 
unexplained  variation  in output, given the explanation  contributed  by 
all the other  arguments  in the production  function. 
In determining  the proper  treatment  of innovations  in durable  goods, 
we start  with the types of shifts in the performance-to-price  ratio that 
have been typical throughout  the evolution of the computer  industry, 
and then apply the same ideas to changes in energy efficiency or other 
aspects  of user  cost. We  can  call  new-model  introduction  "proportional" 
when it raises the performance  of a good by increasing its built-in 378  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  2:1988 
quantity  of characteristics  (X) in the same proportions  as the resources 
used by the supplying  industry.30  Such  an innovation  occurs  when a new 
model is introduced  that is larger  or heavier and costs proportionally 
more to produce. In contrast, a nonproportional  innovation raises 
performance  by a greater  percentage  than  the increase  in resource  cost. 
While  nonproportional  process innovations  that  improve  the produc- 
tivity of inputs in the manufacture  of given models of durable  goods 
occur continuously, the nonproportional  innovations that concern us 
here are those involving both changes in processes and in product 
specifications that occur when a new model is introduced. Such an 
innovation  takes  the  form  of a downward  shift  in  the  real  cost of producing 
a given quantity  of characteristics,  say computer  calculations.  There is 
no shift  in the user  firm's  production  function  (equation  2), since a single 
calculation  still  produces  the same  amount  of final  output  (Q).  The  quality 
change, though  nonproportional,  is not costless, since the reduction  in 
cost must consume managerial  and R&D resources, or else it would 
have occurred  long ago. 
We depict a nonproportional  new-model introduction  in figure  2 by 
plotting  two upward-sloping  lines plotting  the cost function C (Q,X)  of 
old and new models of a particular  type of durable  good corresponding 
to two different  values  of the technical  shift  parameter  X.  Initially,  output 
level Q* is produced  at an input  cost of CO  at point  A. The technological 
change  represented  by the shift  from  Xo  to X1  improves  quality  by raising 
the quantity  of input  characteristics  relative  to their  cost. This raises the 
demand  for characteristics  and  the level of output,  depicted  by Qi in the 
diagram.  The unit  cost of the durable  good (C1)  could be either  higher  or 
lower than in the initial situation (CO).  In the diagram  the unit cost 
declines along the demand  curve D, but the unit cost could increase if 
the demand  curve were to shift  to the right. 
The change in the input price index is simply -  AF,  the vertical 
downward  shift  in the supply  schedule  itself. This would  be measured  in 
practice by taking  the observed reduction  in the price of the machine 
(-AE)  and adding  an adjustment  factor equal to the change in output 
produced by the extra characteristics (EF)  times the marginal  cost 
(EF/EB) of building  the extra  input  characteristics.  This  extra  adjustment 
30. This discussion  summarizes  part  of chapter  2 of Robert  J. Gordon,  The  Measure- 
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Figure 2.  Technological Change and Declining Costs 
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is what is accomplished by estimating  regression coefficients for the 
value  of greater  speed and  memory  in the case of the hedonic  price  index 
for computers used now in the NIPA. For instance, if a new model 
computer  costs 10 percent less than an old model, but the regression 
coefficients  imply  that  its greater  speed  and  memory  represent  40  percent 
higher  quality,  the measured  price decrease is not 10  percent  but rather 
50  percent.  In the example  of the hedonic  price  index  for computers  now 
used in the NIPA, such calculations lead to an annual rate of price 
decline  of about  20 percent. Shifts in the supply  curve like that  depicted 
in figure  2 have greatly increased the performance  of mainframe  com- 380  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1988 
puters  without  reducing  their  average  price. For  instance,  the  IBM  model 
4381-2,  introduced  in 1984,  cost the same $0.5 million  as the IBM model 
7070 introduced  in 1960, but had a calculating  power 1452 times as 
great.31 
The  idea  of nonproportional  quality  change  can  be extended  to changes 
in energy  efficiency  and other  characteristics  that  affect user cost. Now 
a nonproportional  quality  change is one that raises the "net revenue" 
earned  by a machine  (gross revenue minus operating  cost, prior  to the 
deduction  of depreciation  and interest)  relative to the machine's cost, 
holding  constant  the price of output,  energy, and  labor  when comparing 
the net revenue of two alternative  models incorporating  different  tech- 
nologies. To highlight the meaning of nonproportional  in this case, 
consider the introduction  of a more expensive new refrigerator  model. 
If it saves energy with existing technology, and if the extra cost of the 
refrigerator  is equal  to the present  value of energy saving, then this is a 
proportional  change and  just moves us along a fixed cost function, as 
between  A and  G in figure  2. But  the invention  of a new form  of insulation 
that allows all refrigerators  to be more efficient  at the same refrigerator 
price  would  represent  a nonproportional  change  shifting  down  the supply 
curve in figure 2, and this would call for a quality adjustment  and a 
decline in a properly  measured  price index. The most dramatic  example 
of such a change  was the invention  of the  jet plane, which  raised  the net- 
revenue-generating  ability  of a DC-8 compared  with a DC-7 by a factor 
of 10  at a capital  cost only three  times higher. 
The ultimate test of this approach  to the measurement  of durable 
goods prices is to compare  its predictions  with the verdict of the used 
asset market,  as has been done with used aircraft  prices and could now 
be done with the prices of used PCs.32  How does the approach  differ 
from  current  NIPA deflation  procedures?  The NIPA computer  deflator 
treats nonproportional  quality change by the method that we recom- 
mend, so that there is no dispute in principle.  But many improvements 
31. This  example  is taken  from  RobertJ.  Gordon,  "The  Postwar  Evolution  of Computer 
Prices,"  in  Dale  W.  Jorgenson  and  Ralph  Landau,  eds., Technology  and  CapitalFormation 
(MIT  Press, forthcoming),  table 3.9. Over the same interval, 1961-83,  the average  unit 
price  of a mainframe  computer  increased  from  $0.3  to $1.0 million  (table  3.1). 
32.  On used aircraft, see Gordon, Measurement of Durable Goods Prices, chap. 4. On 
used PC prices, see Mark  Lewyn, "Here's What  to Look for in Used PCs," USA Today, 
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in the ratio  of performance  to price  for durable  goods are missed, either 
because official  price  indexes (mainly  components  of the producer  price 
index)  make  inadequate  allowances  for quality  change,  or because price 
indexes are simply missing for important  types of capital equipment, 
such as electronic  telephone switching  equipment,  where technological 
progress  has been rapid.  As for  improvements  in energy  efficiency,  there 
are no explicit  adjustments  in the NIPA.33 
IMPLICATIONS  OF  NEW  MEASURES  OF  DURABLE  GOOD 
DEFLATORS 
In a project to create alternative  price indexes for durable  goods, 
Gordon  has combined  more  than  25,000  annual  price observations  from 
sources independent  of the PPI and CPI, including  the Sears catalog, 
Consumer  Reports  price  quotes and  quality  evaluations  of eight  types of 
appliances and seven other products, used auto and tractor price 
manuals,  government  regulatory  data on the price and performance  of 
commercial  aircraft  and electric generating  stations, independent  data 
on computer  prices, and  American  Telephone  and  Telegraph  data  on the 
price and  performance  of telephone  transmissions  and switching  equip- 
ment.34  For many  of the products  the study carries  out the conventional 
BLS  methodology by comparing only identical models in pairs of 
successive years over the full period 1947-83. For products where 
operating  cost data  are available  for particular  models, adjustments  are 
made for energy efficiency (aircraft, electric generating equipment, 
railroad  locomotives, consumer  appliances)  and in one case (TV sets) 
for repair  frequency. 
The results of the study yield radical  conclusions for some issues, 
while making only a slight contribution  to an understanding  of the 
productivity  slowdown. Some of the implications  for growth rates of 
producers'  and consumers' durable  goods are summarized  in table 9. 
33. Improving  fuel economy  for automobiles  has been implicitly  taken  into account, 
at least in part, by the decision of the BLS not to treat the shrinking  dimensions  of 
"downsized" automobiles  as a decline in quality. If automobiles  of a given size and 
performance  have better  fuel economy now than 20 years ago, however, this aspect of 
quality  improvement  has not been taken  into account. 
34. The latter  collected for a study by Kenneth  Flamm, "Economic  Dimensions  of 
Technological  Advance  in Communications:  A Comparison  with  Computers"  (Brookings, 
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Table 9.  Alternative and NIPA Deflators and Investment-to-GNP Ratios for Durable 
Goods, 1947-83,  Selected Years 
Item  1947  1960  1973  1983 
1.  PDE deflator (1982  =  100) 
Alternativea  59.60  60.10  58.40  99.10 
NIPA  20.60  35.70  47.30  99.50 
Alternative-NIPA  ratio  2.89  1.68  1.23  1.00 
2.  PDE/GNP  (1982 dollars,  percent) 
Alternativea  2.58  3.07  6.02  7.16 
NIPA  6.96  5.00  7.27  7.14 
Alternative-NIPA  ratio  0.37  0.61  0.83  1.00 
3.  Consumer durable expenditures/GNP 
(1982 dollars,  percent) 
Alternativea  3.27  4.66  7.38  8.64 
NIPA  5.30  5.89  8.03  8.65 
Alternative-NIPA  ratio  0.62  0.79  0.92  1.00 
4.  Total durables/GNP 
(1982 dollars, percent) 
Alternativea  5.85  7.73  13.40  15.80 
NIPA  12.26  10.89  15.30  15.79 
Alternative-NIPA  ratio  0.47  0.71  0.88  1.00 
Source:  For further discussion  of the calculation of alternative deflators, see Robert J. Gordon,  The Measuirement 
of Durable  Goods  Prices  (University  of  Chicago  Press  for NBER,  forthcoming),  especially  tables  12.4,  12.5,  and 
12.10. 
a.  Alternative  based  on  new  detailed  price  data assembled  by Gordon,  using T6rnqvist  indexes  that weight  the 
annual percentage  change in components  of real output in each subcategory  between  years t and t + 1 by the average 
of the nominal value weights  in the two adjacent years. 
The new producers'  durable  equipment  (PDE)  deflator  rises 3.0 percent 
a year more  slowly  than the NIPA PDE deflator  for the full 1947-83 
period,  with a somewhat  larger  negative "drift"  in the first  half. Where 
applicable, the same data are reweighted to create a new consumer 
durable  deflator.  The most startling  change  in the numbers  is for  the ratio 
of real PDE spending  to real GNP, as shown in the second section of 
table  9. There  is a smaller  difference  for the consumer-durables-to-GNP 
ratio, but still a major  revision in the ratio  of total durables  spending  to 
GNP, which rises between 1947  and 1983 by 29 percent in the NIPA 
version  and 170  percent  in the new version. 
The finding  on line 2 of table  9 that  the ratio  of equipment  investment 
to output has increased rapidly  during  the postwar period, instead of 
remaining  roughly  constant,  has important  implications  for longstanding 
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growth.  The new data  imply  that  the growth  process has been character- 
ized by more rapid  growth  in real investment  than in real output. This 
carries  over to more  rapid  growth  in real  capital  input  than  in real  output, 
and  to a steady  increase  in  the  capital-output  ratio  throughout  the  postwar 
period. In contrast, the steady state in a standard  neoclassical growth 
model  describes  a situation  in which investment,  capital,  and output  all 
grow at the same rate, and in which the investment-output  and capital- 
output  ratios are constant. The mechanism  by which these ratios grow 
continuously in the new data is not a steady increase in the share of 
saving in total income, but rather  a steady shift in relative prices that 
cheapens  capital  equipment  relative  to other  types of output. 
Soon after his original  articles on growth theory and measurement, 
Robert  Solow advanced  the "embodiment  hypothesis"  that  productivity 
gains result, in large part, from the installation  of capital goods that 
embody new technologies. Some studies, most recently that of Angus 
Maddison,  have interpreted  this hypothesis  to imply  that  explicit  adjust- 
ments should be made to the BEA measures of the capital stock to 
account  for embodied  quality  improvements.35  Presumably,  the embod- 
iment hypothesis implies that better data on quality improvements  in 
capital  goods would substantially  reduce  the growth  accounting  "resid- 
ual," that is, the growth rate of MFP, by raising the growth rate of 
effective capital  input. 
The new price deflators  for capital  equipment  used in table 9 achieve 
Maddison's  desired  adjustments  for performance  improvements  in suc- 
cessive vintages of capital goods and thus can be used both to assess 
Solow's embodiment  hypothesis  and  to determine  whether  the improved 
data  substantially  reduce  the growth  rate  of MFP. As shown in table 10, 
the implications  of the new data  for MFP growth  are surprisingly  small 
and in this sense serve to refute Solow's embodiment  hypothesis that a 
large fraction of MFP growth is attributable  to unmeasured  improve- 
ments in capital  quality. The bottom section of table 10 shows that the 
35. Solow's original  investigation  of the sources  of economic  growth  was "Technical 
Change and the Aggregate Production Function,"  Review  of Economics  and Statistics, 
vol. 39  (August  1957),  pp.  312-20.  His  embodiment  hypothesis  was set  forth  in "Investment 
and  Technical  Progress,"  in K. J. Arrow,  S. Karlin,  and P. Suppes, eds., Mathematical 
Methods in the SocialSciences  (Stanford University Press, 1959). ForMaddison's analysis, 
see "Growth  and Slowdown  in Advanced  Capitalist  Economies:  Techniques  of Quanti- 
tative  Assessment,"  Journal  of Economic  Literature,  vol. 25 (June  1987),  pp. 649-98, esp. 
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Table 10.  Effect of Alternative Durable Goods Deflators in Sources-of-Growth 
Calculation, 1947-83,  Selected Periods 
Annual percentage growth rate over interval, except  where noted 
Item  1947-60  1960-73  1947-73  1973-83  1947-83 
Private GNP 
Alternativea  3.68  4.14  3.91  2.08  3.40 
NIPA  3.35  4.02  3.68  1.82  3.17 
Alternative-NIPA  ratio  0.33  0.12  0.23  0.26  0.23 
Capital input 
Alternativea  4.60  5.73  5.17  4.97  5.11 
NIPA  3.10  3.87  3.49  3.56  3.51 
Alternative-NIPA  ratio  1.50  1.86  1.68  1.41  1.60 
Capital contributionb 
Alternativea  1.15  1.43  1.29  1.24  1.28 
NIPA  0.78  0.97  0.87  0.89  0.88 
Alternative-NIPA  ratio  0.37  0.46  0.42  0.35  0.40 
Private business  labor hours  0.79  1.93  1.36  1.00  1.26 
Labor contributionc  0.59  1.45  1.02  0.75  0.95 
Multifactor productivityd 
Alternativea  1.94  1.26  1.60  0.09  1.17 
NIPA  1.98  1.60  1.79  0.18  1.34 
Alternative-NIPA  ratio  -  0.04  -  0.34  -  0.19  -  0.09  -  0.17 
Sources:  Gordon,  Measuirement of Durable  Goods  Prices,  table  12.11.  Original data for private  business  labor 
hours are from NIPA,  table 6. 11, extrapolated  back from  1948 to  1947 by use  of full-time  equivalent  employment 
from NIPA,  table 6.7A. 
a.  See  table 9,  note a. 
b.  Equals capital input times 0.25. 
c.  Equals labor input times 0.75. 
d.  Equals growth in output minus capital contribution minus labor contribution. 
alternative  deflators  reduce MFP growth  by 0.19 point for 1947-73  and 
0.09 point  for 1973-83.  Thus improved  capital  quality  explains  just one- 
tenth  of the 2.0 growth  rate  of MFP  registered  in table 1  for the pre-  1973 
period,  and about  one-quarter  of the 0.4 growth  rate of MFP  from  table 
1 for the post-1973  period. As for the MFP slowdown itself, the new 
capital  data explain  0.10 point (that  is, the difference  between 0.19 and 
0.09). There  is a simple  reason  why the radical  revisions  to capital  goods 
deflators  have such small  implications  for MFP  growth:  the new deflators 
make  not  just capital  input  but  also output  grow  faster, so that  the impact 
on MFP  growth  is much  less than  on output  or capital  separately. 
DENISON  ON  THE  COMPUTER  DEFLATOR 
The approach  to capital  good prices  just described  has been rapidly 
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been particularly  critical  of the new hedonic  price  deflator  for computers 
now used in the NIPA. Denison's opposition  to the computer  price  index 
derives  from  his belief  that "the line between  the contributions  of capital 
and advances in knowledge, in particular,  should be so drawn  that the 
former  measures growth that results from saving and investment ... 
and the latter measures comprehensively growth that results from 
advances in knowledge  that permit  goods and services to be produced 
with less input."36 
Denison's preferred  method would purge  from capital input growth 
all contributions  of advances in knowledge,  both present  and past. The 
output  of capital  goods would  not be allowed  to reflect  the improvements 
in the ratio of performance  to price that were dubbed  nonproportional 
in the previous section. But even further,  the effects of process innova- 
tions within the capital-goods-producing  industries  would also be ex- 
cluded, for example, improvements  that allow IBM to reduce the labor 
input  in making  a given  model  computer.  If this  procedure  were  followed 
in full, every increase  in the ratio  of capital  goods output  to inputs  would 
be excluded, implying  that capital  goods output  would be measured  by 
labor input. His method would convert a 120 percent increase in the 
output of the nonelectrical  machinery  industry  over 1973-86 into a 2 
percent decline and set productivity  change in that industry  at zero by 
definition.37 
While Denison's desire to track down all contributions  of advances 
in knowledge  at the aggregate  level is a worthy  one, it makes  less sense 
at the industry  level. For many  purposes, such as computing  the private 
and social return of research and development, we want to classify 
innovations  in the industry  where  they occur. Just  as the NIPA computer 
deflator  credits the nonelectrical  machinery  industry with the output 
achieved  by research  in  the  computer  industry,  so our  preferred  approach 
would apply the same principle  uniformly,  crediting  the airframe  and 
aircraft  engine  industries  rather  than  the airlines  for the invention  of the 
jet plane, and the electrical machinery  industry  rather  than the electric 
utilities  for the radical  improvements  in electric generating  equipment 
that  occurred  up through  the late 1960s. 
Denison objects to the NIPA computer  deflator  not  just on principle, 
but also because it introduces  inconsistency  into the national  accounts. 
36. Denison, "Estimates  of Productivity  Change,"  p. 39. 
37. NIPA, table  6.2, line 20, and  table  6.7B (full-time  equivalent  employees),  line 20. 386  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1988 
Computers  are compared  by a marginal  product criterion  while other 
products  are treated  as equivalent  if they would have cost the same to 
produce  in the base period. Here Denison is partly  correct, for indeed 
the NIPA deflators  take no account of radical  improvements  in quality 
in some other types of durable  goods. But rather  than move backward 
toward  the elimination  of the computer  deflator,  we would  move forward 
by applying  consistent principles  to these other products, as has been 
carried  out  for  several  of the most  technologically  progressive  producers' 
durables  in the results summarized  in tables 9 and 10. 
COMPUTER  PRICES  AND  THE  USE  OF  CONSTANT-DOLLAR 
INDEXES 
The NIPA measure  real output, investment, and capital in units of 
1982 dollars. The autos or loaves of bread or computers produced in 
1987  are valued  in real  GNP based upon  the price paid  for these items in 
1982.  Even if we accept that the price indexes that are used do a good 
job of adjusting  for changes  in the nature  of autos or bread  or computers 
over time, this procedure  is still flawed because in fact relative prices 
have changed.  The marginal  utility  of consumer  goods was not the same 
in 1987  as in 1982.  Nor was the marginal  product  of investment  goods. 
The effect of changing relative prices is not random. Goods where 
technological  progress has been rapid  have falling relative prices and 
increasing  sales volumes. The use of base-period  prices  overweights  the 
growth  of these dynamic  commodities  in years following  the base year 
and  underweights  them  in years preceding  the base year. 
In the case of the computer,  the distortion  of real output  created by 
the declining relative price is likely to be important  because of the 
rapidity of the decline. In 1969, investment in office computing and 
accounting  machines (OCAM)  was 6.1 percent of total nonresidential 
equipment  investment  in current  dollars,  but  only 1.6  percent  in constant 
1982  dollars.  In 1986,  OCAM  expenditures  were 11.3 percent  of equip- 
ment spending in current dollars, but were 22.9 percent in constant 
dollars.  Constant-dollar  base-weighted  investment  series imply  that the 
computer  industry  disappears  as you go back  a few years, and  it explodes 
and  takes over the total as you go forward  in time. 
Some of the opposition to the new computer  price index may stem 
from  the observation  that when someone purchased  a computer  in 1975 
that had the same capabilities  as today's PC, this 1975  computer was Martin Neil Baily, Rober-t  J. Gordon  387 
used intensively  and  was essential  to the tasks being  performed.  Today, 
many  computers  sit  idle  in  peoples' offices. However, the  way computers 
are  used today  is what  one would  expect, given their  low price. The way 
to deal with the problem of the declining marginal  productivity of 
computers  is to use Tornqvist  current-year  nominal  shares  in construct- 
ing aggregate  series. How much  difference  would  this make? 
Gordon's  work  provides  one example  of the radical  effects that  occur 
when Tornqvist  indexes are used in place of the NIPA fixed base-year 
method. His basic results reported  in table 9 are based on Tornqvist 
indexes that  weight  the annual  percentage  change  in components  of real 
output  between successive years t and t + 1 in each subcategory  by the 
average of the nominal  value weights in the two adjacent  years. This 
technique  has the effect of weighting  each computer  calculation  by its 
steadily falling price, corresponding  to its steadily declining marginal 
product  for the user. To show the effects of the NIPA fixed-base-year 
method, Gordon  calculates the PDE deflator  in 1972  prices implied  by 
the existing  NIPA deflators  for the 22 subcategories  of PDE. The results 
are striking and suggest what would have occurred if the BEA had 
introduced  its computer  deflator 10 years earlier but kept its existing 
fixed-base-year  methodology  for aggregation.  Instead of roughly  dou- 
bling  from 1972  to 1983,  as occurs with the Tornqvist  weights, the NIPA 
implicit  deflator  would have increased by only 30 percent and in 1983 
would have been at the same level as in 1978.  The weight of OCAM  in 
total PDE in 1983 would have been 60 percent, in contrast to its 11 
percent  nominal  share. 
To assess the effects to date of the use of fixed 1982  price weights, we 
have roughly  separated  computers  from  the rest of investment  and then 
combined  the two parts  using  current-year  shares  (see table 11).  The re- 
sults  are shown  first  for OCAM  and  PDE investment.  It is clear  that  com- 
puters  are  driving  the  dynamism  of equipment  investment  since  1979.  With- 
out computers,  PDE investment  was actually  falling  during  1979-87.  The 
distortion  caused  by the underweighting  before 1982  and the overweight- 
ing afterwards  makes  a difference,  raising  real PDE growth  0.52 percent 
a year  during  1973-79  and  lowering  it 0.44 percent  a year  during  1979-87. 
We extrapolated  recent investment  trends  forward  and  found  that  by 
1996 the constant-dollar  base-weighted measure of  PDE would be 
growing  three times as fast as the real output measure  calculated  with 
current-year  weights. Presumably  the NIPA's procedures  or the base 
year  or both  will  be adjusted  by then, but  these results  provide  a warning 388  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1988 
Table 11.  Alternative Measures of Real Output Growth for Producers' Durable 
Equipment and Office Computing and Accounting Machines,  1973-79 and 1979-87 
Percent per year 
Item  1973-79  1979-87 
Conventional 
NIPA PDE  4.33  2.64 
NIPA OCAM  19.79  24.28 
NIPA PDE less OCAM  3.85  -0.37 
Alternative 
PDE with current-year  share 
weights  for OCAMa  4.85  2.20 
Sources:  PDE  and OCAM for  1973 and  1979 taken from NIPA,  table 5.7.  PDE  and OCAM for  1987 taken from 
Survey of Current Business,  vol.  68 (July 1988), table 5.7. 
a.  The  rate of growth between  two  years  t and t-  1 is calculated  as the weighted  average  of the rates of growth 
of  OCAM and PDE  excluding  OCAM,  both  series  measured  in  1982 dollars.  The weights  are the average current- 
dollar shares of OCAM and PDE  excluding  OCAM in total current-dollar PDE,  where the average  is over  the two 
years  t and t-  1. 
about the validity of the investment series now being released and those 
coming in the next few years.  Already these  procedures  are causing a 
significant distortion of official data on growth in both PDE and GNP. 
Although the BEA  now publishes  chain-linked deflators for PDE and 
GNP  that approximate  the use  of Tornqvist  indexes,  it does  not use 
these deflators to compute real PDE or GNP. Superior measures of real 
PDE  and GNP  growth can be obtained  by  subtracting the difference 
between  the  chain  and  implicit  deflators  from  the  existing  official 
estimates  of growth in real PDE  and GNP.  The resulting calculation 
shows that real PDE growth was overstated by 3.2 percent and real GNP 
growth  by  0.8  percent  for  the  four  quarters  ending  in  1988:2.38  Policy- 
makers may be led by official data on real growth to overstate  the pace 
of the current economic  expansion. 
Computer  Power  in the Using Industries 
Whatever one's view of particular measurement procedures, there is 
no  question  that the  computer  has  been  enthusiastically  adopted  by 
38. The existing  real  GNP series  is equal  by definition  to nominal  GNP divided  by the 
implicit  GNP deflator.  Our  preferred  real GNP series is equal  to the same nominal  GNP 
value divided  by the BEA's chain  deflator  for GNP, and the same for our preferred  real 
PDE series. Growth  rates  of NIPA implicit  and  chain-weighted  deflators  are  from  Survey 
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American  industry and has brought  about major changes in the way 
business  is conducted.  A fundamental  paradox  in U.S. productivity  over 
the past 20 years is that  during  a period  seen by many  as one of rapid  or 
even accelerating  technological  change, productivity  growth has been 
weak. Moreover, the sectors in which computers  and other electronic 
equipment  are being  used are showing  particularly  slow growth.  ALP in 
these industries should certainly have benefited from the electronics 
revolution.  Why not? 
As a first step toward  answering  this question it is worth looking at 
electronics investment. Table 12 shows the net stocks of computers, 
communications  equipment,  and  related  capital  by industry  for 1987  and 
earlier  periods.  These data  are  based  upon  industry  of ownership,  which 
is a problem  for this type of capital, for which leasing is important.  In 
addition, the coverage is much more extensive than  just computers. 
Communications  equipment  is clearly  an important  part  of the total. 
The manufacturing  sector is not a big owner of the electronic equip- 
ment  it produces.  In fact, within  manufacturing,  the machinery  industry 
is the largest  owner of electronic  equipment,  where presumably  its use 
and ownership are tied quite closely  to its production. Outside of 
manufacturing,  the communications  industry stands out as a service 
industry that has invested heavily in electronics and achieved rapid 
productivity  growth  by doing so. Communications  is the exception that 
proves the rule, however, since the other white-collar  areas-trade, 
finance,  insurance,  and  real  estate, and services-are  all fairly  intensive 
in their  shares  of electronics  capital,  and  all have had weak growth. 
Analysts have offered five reasons why electronics investment has 
not paid off in greater  productivity  growth in the white-collar  service 
industries.39 
First, dramatic  changes in technology can make productivity  worse 
before it gets better. People have to be retrained,  and companies  have 
to learn how to use the new technology efficiently. This hypothesis 
39. Baily  and  Chakrabarti,  Innovation,  pp. 86-102;  Office  of Technology  Assessment, 
Automation ofAmerica's  Offices, 1985-2000 (GPO, 1985); Stephen S. Roach, "America's 
Technology  Dilemma:  A Profile  of the Information  Economy," Special  Economic  Study 
(Morgan  Stanley,  April  22, 1987);  H. Allan  Hunt  and  Timothy  L. Hunt, Clerical  Employ- 
ment  and Technological  Change  (Kalamazoo,  Michigan:  W. E. Upjohn  Institute, 1986); 
Gary  W. Loveman, "The Productivity  of Information  Technology  Capital:  An Econo- 
metric  Analysis" (Massachusetts  Institute  of Technology, January  31, 1986);  and Paul 
Osterman,  "The Impact  of Computers  on the Employment  of Clerks  and Managers," 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, vol. 39 (January 1986), pp. 175-86. Table 12.  Net Stocks of Computers, Office and Accounting Machinery, Communications 
Equipment, Instruments, Photocopiers, and Related Equipment, by Industry, Selected 
Periods, 1960-87 




Computers  tions  Computers and 
and com-  equipment  communications 
Total non-  munica-  as a per-  equipment as  a 
residential  tions  cent of  percent  of total 
capital,  equipment,  total, 
Industry  1987  1987  1987  1960-69  1970-79 
Manufacturing  763.30  77.25  10.1  1.6  2.8 
Nonmanufacturing  2,810.00  454.07  16.2  4.4  6.7 
Mining  256.80  0.18  0.1  0.1  0.1 
Construction  50.10  2.15  4.3  0.7  0.5 
Transportation  254.34  2.88  1.1  0.5  0.6 
Rail  96.18  0.50  0.5  0.5  0.7 
Nonrail  158.16  2.38  1.5  0.7  0.5 
Air  36.69  0.86  2.3  0.7  0.4 
Trucking  48.20  0.17  0.4  0.5  0.1 
Other  73.27  1.34  1.8  0.8  0.8 
Communications  317.66  172.73  54.4  30.6  40.8 
Public utilities  448.86  19.74  4.4  0.6  1.1 
Total trade  413.48  52.82  12.8  0.9  2.5 
Retail  237.59  9.02  3.8  0.5  1.1 
Wholesale  175.89  43.80  24.9  1.8  4.9 
FIRE  719.78  143.94  20.0  5.7  6.0 
Finance  and insurance  234.73  90.51  38.6  3.5  4.7 
Banks  109.15  37.17  34.1  1.9  3.9 
Credit agencies  68.61  18.19  26.5  3.1  3.3 
Securities  6.61  3.88  58.7  3.9  8.3 
Insurance carriers  47.24  30.12  63.8  4.4  7.2 
Insurance agents  3.12  1.16  37.2  15.6  12.0 
Holding companies  16.90  9.10  53.E  8.0  10.2 
Real estate  468.15  44.32  9.5  6.1  6.3 
Services  348.98  59.63  17.1  6.5  8.3 
Hotels  61.34  1.36  2.2  0.1  0.2 
Personal  13.00  1.79  13.8  9.3  13.6 
Business  92.04  25.68  27.9  7.9  10.9 
Auto repair  60.34  1.01  1.7  0.5  0.2 
Miscellaneous  repair  7.53  0.28  3.7  0.4  0.5 
Motion pictures  6.32  2.97  47.0  15.0  31.5 
Amusement  21.65  4.65  21.5  9.7  12.3 
Other  81.76  21.89  26.8  12.2  13.3 
Health  52.37  16.39  31.3  16.0  19.2 
Legal  7.06  1.32  18.7  2.9  4.0 
Educational  2.06  1.19  57.8  9.5  12.2 
Other  20.27  2.98  14.7  10.0  6.6 
Sources:  1987  total  nonresidential  capital  for  manufacturing,  mining,  and  construction  taken  from  "Fixed 
Reproducible  Tangible  Wealth in the  United  States,"  Survey of  Current Blusiness,  vol.  68 (August  1988), table 4. 
Remaining data from Stephen  S. Roach,  "America's  Technology  Dilemma: A Profile of the Information Economy," 
Special Economic  Study (Morgan Stanley,  April 22,  1987), for 1960-69 and 1970-79; and Stephen  S. Roach,  "White- 
Collar Productivity: A Glimmer of Hope?"  Special Economic  Study (Morgan Stanley,  September  16, 1988), for 1987. Martin Neil Baily, Robert J. Gordon  391 
suggests that future  productivity  gains will be rapid,  as the training  and 
learning  take place. That productivity  growth  has been decelerating  in 
nonfarm  nonmanufacturing,  however, bodes poorly  for this hypothesis. 
Second, the electronics  revolution  involves the acquisition,  process- 
ing, and distribution  of information.  This information  may be used to 
take customers, profits,  or capital  gains away from other  companies. If 
computers  are used extensively in ways that redistribute  wealth rather 
than increase it, then their productivity  effects will be reduced. For 
example,  some  computers  and  telephones  are  used  in  marketing  activities 
that  are largely  forms  of advertising. 
Third,  the technology  of computers  may encourage  waste and ineffi- 
ciency. Computers  provide a flow of services to companies that the 
companies  do not know how to value. White-collar  groups sometimes 
measure  their  performance  on the basis of the amount  of information  or 
paperwork  they generate  rather  than  on its value to a company. 
Fourth,  computers  may improve  working  conditions. Does any sec- 
retary  lament  the passing of purple  ditto masters  on which corrections 
were made with razor blades? Does not the mastery of soft fonts and 
page layout provide more job satisfaction than drone-like repetitive 
retyping  of successive drafts?  This view would argue  that  the stagnation 
of real wages in some occupations is exaggerated,  because wage pay- 
ments  have been held down as a compensating  differential  for improved 
job satisfaction.  We firmly  believe that  this effect constitutes  part  of the 
overall  impact  of computers  but  do not  pursue  it  for  lack  of hard  evidence. 
The final  point, and  the one most directly  related  to this paper,  is that 
computers  and  related  equipment  may  be providing  valuable  services to 
customers  that are not being picked up in the official  output  data. This 
point  provides  the wedge through  which  we may  attempt  to locate errors 
in the measurement  of consumer  service output  by arguing  that  deflators 
for  consumer  expenditures  on services  do not adequately  capture  quality 
improvements  created  by computers. 
In  future  work  we plan  to explore several  of these alternative  hypoth- 
eses more fully, but in this paper  we are concentrating  on the idea that 
computers  have made it harder  to measure output. First, we look at 
general  examples  of ways in  which  computers  are  increasing  convenience 
or providing  other services. Then, in our first  case study, we look more 
closely at finance,  insurance,  and  real  estate, a sector  that  includes  many 
industries  that  are  heavy users  of computers  and  related  equipment.  Just 392  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1988 
the beginning  of a list of computer-based  consumer service improve- 
ments  and  innovations  would include  the following. 
-The  transportation  sector offers pre-assigned  seats and boarding 
passes, "no-stop" check-in,  frequent-flyer  plans  that  amount  to unmea- 
sured  price  reductions,  and  price  discrimination  that  has reduced  prices 
for consumers relative to businessmen. Consumers can delay their 
Christmas  shopping  because of overnight  delivery services that offer 
continuous  package  tracking  for the rare  instances  when something  does 
not arrive  as promised. 
-The  retail  trade  sector offers  better  inventory  control,  fewer stock- 
outs, and  most notably  the radical  increase  in the variety  of items carried 
that we document in our case study below. Drugstore chains have 
introduced  computerized  prescription  records that allow prescriptions 
to be refilled  from  any branch  store in the chain. 
-The  finance sector offers all-in-one cash management  accounts, 
costless portfolio  diversification  for even the smallest  investors  through 
no-load mutual  funds, automatic  telephone machines allowing almost 
instantaneous  credit card approvals, fast bill-paying  by phone or PC, 
and  24-hour  money machines. 
-Hotel  chains  provide  frequent-stayer  services that, upon  recitation 
of a single number,  allow a reservation  to be made  without  the need for 
a telephone caller to mention a name, credit card number, or room 
preference.  The hotels  themselves  provide  pre-printed  registration  forms, 
no-stop check out, and clerks who answer the room-service  phone by 
telling  the guest his name  and  room  number,  instead  of vice versa. 
-Restaurants,  supermarkets,  and, less happily, hospitals provide 
itemized  bills for those curious  to know where their  money has gone. 
Case Studies of Measurement  in Specific Sectors 
There is only so much  to be learned  from  aggregative  data  about the 
potential  size of measurement  errors.  To go further  it is essential to be 
specific about how price deflators and real output are calculated in 
particular  cases. Thus we turn  now to a case study approach,  choosing 
examples where we suspect from the outset that data errors may be 
important.  We hope also that these case study examples will suggest 
ways of improving  output measurement  that could be used in other 
sectors. Martin Neil Baily, Robert J. Gordon  393 
Figure 3.  Gross Capital Stock per Employee (1982 Dollars), Finance and Insurance and 
Total Nonfarm, 1958-87 
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The financial services industry is extremely dynamic, with rapid 
employment  growth, a high rate of capital accumulation,  and a steady 
flow of new products.40  The insurance  industry  seems ideally suited to 
the data-handling  capabilities of modern computers; both it and the 
finance  industry  have invested heavily in new capital. Figure 3 shows 
that capital per worker in this industry  has grown much more rapidly 
than in the economy as a whole. In this case study we look first at the 
finance,  insurance,  and  real  estate sector  as a whole, and  review  problems 
in the measurement  of output in the insurance  and real estate parts of 
the sector. We then focus on financial  services and  the banking  industry 
in  particular  as a case study  within  the  case study.  Banking  is an  important 
part  of the total and is an industry  where data availability  allows some 
alternative  productivity  estimates  to be made. 394  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1988 
Table 13.  Shares of Industries in Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate Output, 1948-87, 
Selected Years 
Percent 
Industry  1948  1965  1973  1979  1987 
Banking  22.51  18.79  19.56  19.43  18.43 
Credit agencies  1.61  2.05  1.73  1.83  2.42 
Securities  3.95  4.04  3.91  3.37  6.21 
Insurance carriers  12.72  11.85  11.10  10.25  10.79 
Insurance agents  8.63  7.94  7.09  6.42  6.97 
Real estatea  49.56  54.20  54.78  56.49  52.00 
Holding companies  1.02  1.13  1.82  2.22  3.18 
Source: Slurvey of Clurrent  Blusiness, vol.  68 (July 1988), tables 6.2 and 1.24. 
a.  Real estate  less  gross owner-occupied  housing and farm housing. 
The  finance,  insurance,  and  real  estate sector  includes  banking,  credit 
agencies, the securities industry,  insurance  carriers,  insurance  agents, 
real  estate, and  holding  and  other  investment  companies.  The real  estate 
industry  includes real estate agents and rental  property.  The shares of 
the components  of the overall sector over the postwar  years are shown 
in table 13. In 1987  real  estate alone accounted  for over half  of the sector 
in terms of GDP originating  and for almost 23 percent of employment. 
The imputed  income of owner-occupied  houses (and  farm  dwellings)  is 
excluded  from  the business sector and  from  table 13. 
Table 14  provides  the labor  productivity  growth  rates for each of the 
industries  in the sector and for the sector as a whole. The labor input 
used in the calculations  in this table is the "number  of persons engaged 
in  production,"  including  full-time  equivalent  employees and  those who 
are  self-employed.  The figures  for the sector  as a whole, therefore,  differ 
somewhat  from  those given in table  4, which used the BLS estimates of 
total  hours.  The BEA uses labor  input  to extrapolate  real  output  changes 
for the banking,  credit, securities, and holding  company  sectors, and it 
should, therefore, show no productivity  growth  except for mix effects 
within  the industries.  That is roughly  confirmed  by table 14. Within  the 
insurance  and real  estate industries,  rents, premiums,  and  commissions 
are used to estimate nominal dollar output, and various deflators, to 
calculate  constant-dollar  output. Thus it is possible for the official  data 
in these industries  to show productivity  growth. Indeed, the real estate 
sector  showed  substantial  growth  during  1948-65,  and  insurance  carriers 
have achieved some productivity  growth  both pre-  and post-1973,  even 
though  their  performance  was rather  erratic  over shorter  periods. Mar-tin  Neil Baily, Robert J. Gordon  395 
Table 14.  Labor Productivity Growth of Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate Sectors, 
1948-87,  Selected Periodsa 
Percent per year 
Chatnge, 
1948-73 
1948-  1965-  1973-  1979-  1948-  1973-  to 
Sector  65  73  79  87  73  87  1973-87 
Total  1.70  0.78  0.09  -0.79  1.41  -0.41  -1.82 
Banking  0.00  0.02  0.01  0.08  0.00  0.05  0.05 
Credit agencies  -0.21  -  0.20  0.12  0.01  -0.20  0.05  0.25 
Securities  0.08  -0.11  0.03  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.00 
Insurance carriers  0.96  1.82  0.00  1.48  1.23  0.84  -0.39 
Insurance agents  0.42  -  0.06  -  2.60  -  0.42  0.26  -  1.36  -  1.62 
Real estateb  4.84  -0.04  -0.05  -  1.28  3.25  -0.76  -4.01 
Holding companies  -0.36  -0.01  -0.12  0.03  -0.25  -0.04  0.21 
Source:  Survey  of Currenit  Blusiness, vol. 68 (July 1988),  tables  6.2, 1.24,  and 6. IOB. 
a. Labor  input  measured  as number  of persons  engaged  in production  including  full-time  equivalent  employees 
and self-employed. 
b. Real  estate less gross  owner-occupied  housing  and farm  housing. 
DEFLATORS  IN  REAL  ESTATE  AND  INSURANCE 
Because real estate and insurance  made  up 70 percent  of total sector 
output in 1987, the quality of the deflators  used in these industries  is 
crucial  to the accurate  measurement  of output  in the sector as a whole. 
In practice the deflators used are either inappropriate  or subject to 
substantial  error. 
The deflators  used for the insurance  industry  are those developed  for 
the industries  being  covered  by the insurance.  The auto  repair  cost index 
is used for auto insurance,  medical  costs for medical  insurance,  and so 
on. This deflator  is applied  to the nominal  output  of the industry,  which 
is calculated as the difference between insurance  premiums  paid and 
claim  reimbursements  returned.  Thus, the productivity  weakness in the 
insurance  sector is being driven  by the escalation  of cost indexes in the 
medical care area and in repair services, even though the insurance 
industry is engaged in an entirely different productive activity.41  An 
example  can illustrate  how the problem  distorts measures  of insurance 
productivity.  Suppose a medical  insurance  policy in the base year cost 
$100. This policy, on average, paid for nine visits to a doctor at $10 a 
visit. The  remaining  $10  was retained  by the insurance  company  to cover 
41. Even  if one accepted  this  approach  to deflation  there  are  serious  problems  with  the 
particular  deflators  used. The medical  care cost index neglects the tremendous  quality 
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Table 15.  Rates of Growth of Price Deflator for Insurance and GNP,  1948-87,  Selected 
Periods 
Percent per year 
Insurance  Insurance 
Period  carriers  agents  GNP 
1948-73  3.89  5.03  2.97 
1973-79  9.61  9.13  7.69 
1979-87  6.28  6.39  5.05 
Sources:  Data for 1948, 1973, and 1979 from NIPA,  tables 6.1,  6.2,  and 7.4.  Data for  1987 from Survey of Current 
Business,  vol.  68 (July 1988), tables 6.1,  6.2,  and 7.4. 
its costs and profits. Suppose that some years later an identical  policy 
that cost $465 paid for nine visits at $50 a visit, with the insurance 
company  retaining  $15  and  performing  the same services as before. The 
BEA says that visits have risen in cost by a factor of five and computes 
a total real  output  of $93, of which only $3 consists of real  gross product 
originating  in the insurance  industry.  On this calculation,  real output  in 
insurance  is way  down,  but,  by assumption,  true  real  output  has  remained 
constant. After excluding the insurance provided as an intermediate 
good to businesses, this distortion  of real  output  does lead to a distortion 
of final  GNP. 
Obviously  any distortion  of real  output  in practice  depends  upon  how 
the deflators  actually used compare  with true deflators,  and these are 
unknown. The trends in the actual deflators are shown in table 15, 
together with trends in the implicit  deflator  for GNP as a benchmark. 
Given that  the insurance  industry  has been able to benefit  not only from 
computerization,  but also from  the widespread  use of group  policies, it 
is implausible  that  insurance  costs should  have risen  faster  than  the price 
level for GNP. 
An appropriate  real output series for the insurance  industry  should 
be based upon the number  of policies issued, with allowance made for 
changes in quality resulting from changes in the extent of coverage 
provided. An additional  activity by life insurance  companies, namely, 
the management  of saving  and  mutual  fund  investment,  should  be treated 
comparably  to that  of other  financial  intermediaries. 
The real estate industry's  output  is the rental  income it receives and 
the commissions  of realtors.  This nominal  output  is deflated  using  rental 
cost indexes for residential  and commercial  rents. The series for com- 
mercial  rents  relies on reports  in the industry  of rental  prices per square Martin Neil Baily, Robert J. Gordon  397 
foot in major markets. Standard  rental cost indexes have moved up 
rapidly  since 1973,  resulting  in negative  reported  productivity  growth  in 
the industry.  The problem  in using  the available  rent  indexes as deflators 
is that  they do not adjust  for changes  in the quality  of the property  being 
rented. A commercial  office building  today is very different  from one 
built  20 years ago. The rent index carries  over some of the problems  of 
the construction  price index. It would be possible, at least in principle, 
to apply  the hedonic technique  using office space of different  vintage  to 
control  for this quality  change. 
One important  reason  why one would expect "productivity"  to have 
declined  in the real  estate sector is that  the output  in the industry  is made 
up largely  of the return  to capital.  Decisions to hold real  estate property 
are based not only on its rental  income return,  but also on the expected 
capital gain from the property and the land it occupies. People are 
sometimes  willing  to invest in property  with a low or even negative  rate 
of return  from rents, counting  on a continuation  of large capital  gains. 
Market  equilibrium  in the 1970s  and 1980s  has resulted  in a low marginal 
product  for real estate investment. 
FINANCIAL  SERVICES 
The output  of the financial  services industry  is measured  on the basis 
of labor  input  and  thus  ignores  any output  per hour  gains  by definition.42 
Clearly, alternative output series are needed, and we report now a 
fragmentary  attempt  to measure  output  per employee in the securities 
industry.  Data for selected years on the number  of shares traded  in all 
markets,  the market  value  of shares,  and  the number  of persons  engaged 
in the securities  industries  are shown in table 16. 
42. Timothy  F. Bresnahan  has constructed  a series for capital  input  for this industry 
using  the new computer  price series and  then estimating  the welfare  gains from  comput- 
erization.  His work is of great  interest, but does not provide  an alternative  measure  of 
output  for productivity  analysis, nor is that his intention.  Welfare  measures  are not the 
same  as productivity  measures.  His procedure  implies  that  output  in the industry  should 
be measured  from  labor  and  capital  inputs,  not  just labor  alone. Using  both  factors  rather 
than  one is certainly  an improvement  and  would  allow  for labor  productivity  growth,  but 
it does not provide  the independent  output  series needed for productivity  analysis. See 
Timothy  F. Bresnahan,  "Measuring  the Spillovers  from  Technical  Advance:  Mainframe 
Computers  in Financial  Services,"  American  Economic  Review,  vol. 76  (September  1986), 
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Table 16.  Number and Value of Shares Traded and Number of Employees 




Number  (millions 
of shares  of current  Employees 
Year  (millions)  dollars)  (thousands) 
1961  2,010  63,802  145 
1965  2,587  89,225  147 
1973  5,723  177,878  209 
1979  10,850  299,750  228 
1987  63,771  2,284,166  516 
Sources:  Employees  for  1961,  1965,  1973, and  1979 from NIPA,  table 6.10B;  for  1987, from Survey of  Cuirrent 
Business,  vol.  68 (July 1988), table 6. IOB. Market values  and number of shares traded for 1961, 1965, 1973, and 1979 
taken from Business  Statistics,  1984, A Supplemenit to Survey of Current Buisiness, p. 75; for  1987, from Survey of 
Current Business,  vol.  68 (July 1988). 
Based upon number of shares traded per person engaged in the 
industry, productivity growth looks extremely strong in all years, 
accelerating  in recent years. Based upon the value of shares traded 
deflated  by the GNP deflator,  productivity  growth  was weak over much 
of the period, but did accelerate post-1979. The figures are shown in 
table 17. These results certainly  indicate that productivity  growth has 
increased  since 1979.  Obviously  many  activities  are  being  missed  by this 
single output measure, including bond and option trading and the 
provision  of investment advice. Taking  account of these things would 
probably  strengthen  the conclusion  that  the industry  has  had  rapid  output 
per hour  growth  in the 1980s. 
PRODUCTIVITY  IN  BANKING 
Commercial  banks engage in three main activities: transactions  in- 
volving  demand  and  time  deposits, lending  to businesses  and  consumers, 
including  real estate loans, and fiduciary  activities involving the man- 
agement and administration  of trusts and estates.43  Other activities 
include money market  operations  for the bank's own portfolio, main- 
taining safe deposit boxes, issuing insurance, and giving investment 
43. This section  draws  on Horst  Brand  and  John  Duke, "Productivity  in Commercial 
Banking:  Computers  Spur  the Advance," Monthly  Labor  Review (December  1982),  pp. 
19-27; Stephen Ledford, BAI Survey of the Check Collection System (Rolling Meadows, 
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Table 17.  Growth of Shares Traded per Employee in the Securities Industry,  1965-87, 
Selected Periods 
Percent per year 
Real market 
Number  of  value of 
shares per  shares per 
Period  employee  employeea 
1965-73  5.68  -0.54 
1973-79  9.65  -0.46 
1979-87  12.67  11.38 
Sources:  Same as table  16. 
a.  Market value adjusted by GNP deflator. 
advice. By far  the most important  of these activities  involves processing 
the transactions  made  with demand  deposits and  processing  loans. 
Substantial  productivity increases in check processing have been 
revealed by surveys by the Bank  Administration  Institute  from 1971  to 
1986.44  The Institute looks at several indicators of improved perfor- 
mance, and at overall labor productivity  in particular.  The number  of 
checks processed per hour  rose from  265 items per worker  hour  in 1971 
to 825 items per worker  hour  in 1986,  a rate of increase  of 7.6 percent  a 
year. During 1973-79 the rate of increase was 6.2 percent a year and 
during  1979-86  it was 6.3 percent  a year. Clearly  in check processing, a 
major  activity of banks, there has been an enormous  increase  in output 
per hour. And this measure of productivity  growth understates  labor 
productivity improvement in handling transactions, because of the 
growth of electronic funds transfers (EFTs). In 1979 a conventional 
check cost 50 cents to process, whereas by contrast, EFTs had an 
average incremental  processing cost of 7 cents.45  At present EFTs 
represent  only 1-2 percent of transactions;  their quantitative  impact  is 
probably  yet to be  felt. But  it is unlikely  that  productivity  in  the  processing 
of demand  deposit transactions  will slow down. 
THE  BLS  BANKING  INDEX 
The BLS now publishes  an  index  of labor  productivity  for commercial 
banking  based upon the check processing activities of banks and their 
loan  and  trust  activities.  Like  all  indexes  in  the BLS industry  productivity 
measurement  program,  including  those for transportation  and retailing 
44.  Ledford, BAI Survey of the Check Collection System. 
45. Frederick  J. Schroeder, "Developments  in Consumer  Electronic  Funds Trans- 
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examined  below, the BLS banking  index is quite  separate  from  the BEA 
estimate  of value added  in the industry.46  BLS combines  the three  types 
of activity into an overall output  index using the shares  of employment 
associated  with  each, based on periodic  surveys  by the Federal  Reserve. 
The annual  percentage  growth rates in output  per employee hour that 
they compute  are as follows:47 
Period  Output growth 
1967-73  2.25 
1973-79  0.45 
1979-85  1.76 
These numbers offer a striking  parallel to productivity  trends in the 
whole economy. Growth  was fairly  rapid  before 1973,  slowed almost  to 
zero during  1973-79,  and  has made  a partial  recovery since then. 
Why  the sustained  growth  in the productivity  of check processing  did 
not boost productivity  growth  overall  in the industry  may  seem puzzling, 
but there are three explanations. First, there has been a tremendous 
increase  in branch  banking.  So many  banks  now dot street corners  that 
Art Buchwald  has suggested  that they be required  to sell gas to replace 
the gas stations  they are displacing.  Between 1967  and 1979  the number 
of bank offices rose 62 percent, and the average  population  served per 
bank  fell from  6,000  in 1970  to 4,400 in 1980.48  The link  from  the increase 
in branch  banking  to slower  productivity  growth  is made  on the basis of 
the "wide agreement  among  industry  observers  that scale economies in 
banking have declined with the spread of branching-that is,  more 
resources  including  labor  inputs, are required  per unit  of output."49 
We  are  not  persuaded  that  this "wide  agreement"  is quite  as definitive 
as is suggested.  The case for economies  of scale is based  on data  showing 
the superior  performance  of large  banks  over small  town  and  rural  banks. 
But  that  superiority  probably  arose  more  from  the relative  organizational 
and  technological  backwardness  of small  banks.  The  trend  in  the  industry 
has been toward consolidation of small banks into large companies, 
46. The findings  reported  here are not incorporated  at all in BLS's estimates of 
aggregate  business  productivity. 
47. See Brand  and  Duke, "Productivity  in Commercial  Banking";  BLS, "Continued 
Gains  in Industry  Productivity  in 1987  Reported  by BLS," News, October  3, 1988. 
48.  American Bankers Association,  Statistical Information on the Financial  Services 
Industry  (Washington,  1981),  p. 89. 
49. Brand  and Duke, "Productivity  in Commercial  Banking,"  p. 25. They cite two 
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where  the  branches  have access to the  technology  and  computer  facilities 
that were previously available only in large banks. Probably  just as 
important  is convenience, one of the main themes of our paper that 
emerges  here  and  again  in studying  the  retail  industry.  Clearly  a reduction 
in the population-to-branch  ratio must bring  the average  branch  closer 
and reduce the shoe-leather transaction cost  of consumer financial 
activities. 
The second reason for the reported  slow growth  of banking  produc- 
tivity is that the BLS procedure  of weighting individual  activities by 
their  relative  labor  input  shares  automatically  biases against  a finding  of 
growth.  Consider  the case of consumer  loans. Despite computerization, 
the processing of a conventional  consumer  loan takes a lot of time. In 
order  to economize on the transactions  costs involved in loans, banks 
now issue lines of credit as a matter  of routine, including, of course, 
conventional  credit  cards.  With  a pre-approved  line of credit,  consumers 
can borrow  and  repay  easily. And in response  to changes  in the tax law, 
this is now being  done routinely  for loans backed  with  real  estate. Banks 
have been able to make loan transactions  comparable  in cost to that of 
processing  checks. The BLS procedure  makes  these transactions  into a 
separate  category  from  conventional  loans, and  gives them  a low weight 
precisely because of their  low labor  input. 
The third  reason for a slower than expected rate of growth in bank 
productivity  is that computerization  has been difficult,  because of the 
history of the industry  and its regulatory  controls. The banking  system 
has developed with small banks serving local markets. Each bank 
developed its own operating  procedures,  with the result that standard 
software  packages  cannot  be simply  applied  to a given bank. The many 
special  features  written  into the package  create so many  problems  that 
bank  staff often have to continue  to use the old paper-based  procedures 
in parallel  with the new methods. Sometimes the dual procedures  can 
compound  the problems.  For example, an account is closed by making 
computer  entries  and  by having  paperwork  processed at the head office. 
By the time the paperwork  is completed, the computer  has charged  a 
new service charge to the account and refuses to close it because the 
account  has a negative  balance.50 
50. This discussion was based on a conversation  with Frank W. Reilly, of Reilly 
Associates,  Inc., a consultant  to the banking  industry.  Software  packages  for  Washington- 
area banks are written by local companies  that have had difficulty  remaining  solvent 
because  of repeated  problems  in getting  bugs  out of programs. 402  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1988 
A  ROUGH  REESTIMATE  OF  PRODUCTIVITY  IN  FINANCE, 
INSURANCE,  AND  REAL  ESTATE 
The decline in the rate of return  in real estate and the problems of 
computerization  in banking help explain why productivity gains in 
finance,  insurance,  and  real estate may have been restrained  in the past 
15 years. But every other indication  suggests that productivity  growth 
is being understated.  The use of rental  price indexes effectively carries 
some of the problems  of measurement  in the construction  sector, to be 
discussed next, into this service industry.  The deflation  of the insurance 
industry  is inappropriate  and has biased the estimates of growth in all 
periods. The extent of the bias has probably increased because the 
procedures  effectively deflate away all the gains that have come from 
computerization  and the rapid  spread  of group  insurance.  The financial 
services industry  has become extremely  innovative  in the past 15  years, 
and the BLS attempt  to capture  this in the banking  industry  is flawed  in 
execution. 
Although  our analysis does not allow direct estimates of the errors 
involved  in productivity  measurement,  it is worthwhile  making  an order- 
of-magnitude  calculation of what might be involved. Banks, credit 
agencies, securities  firms,  and holding  companies  are assumed to have 
no growth.  Suppose  they had  2 percent  growth  before 1973  and  3 percent 
after 1973. The insurance  industry  has shown growth, but growth has 
been understated,  especially since 1973. Suppose the understatement 
was 1 percent pre-1973  and 2 percent  post-1973.  The real estate sector 
showed over 4 percent  growth  before 1965,  but nothing  after. Problems 
with construction  deflators  surely  contributed  to this collapse. Suppose 
there were 2 percent a year understatement  after 1965 (not just after 
1973). Given the shares of the industries in the total sector, these 
magnitudes  would imply  a 1.1 percent  a year understatement  of growth 
pre-1973  and  2.3 percent  understatement  post-1973. 
The Construction  Enigma 
There  is no more  obvious candidate  than  construction  for a measure- 
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Table 18.  Construction Industry, United States and Canada,  1948-86, 
Selected Years 
Index,  1967 =  100 
Item  1948  1957  1967  1972  1977  1982  1986 
Untited  States 
1. Structures  real GNP  48.3  71.8  100.0  120.1  116.0  104.1  134.7 
2. Real new construction  47.6  70.4  100.0  118.3  108.2  92.1  128.8 
3. Construction  materials  52.3  73.6  100.0  124.0  129.7  114.5  161.7 
4. Real value added  47.2  74.7  100.0  87.4  86.6  73.9  88.3 
5. Hours  worked  68.0  84.1  100.0  111.0  112.7  113.1  140.3 
6. Real net capital  stock  52.8  69.1  100.0  124.7  157.2  164.4  n.a. 
7. Output-hours  ratio  70.0  83.8  100.0  106.6  96.0  81.4  91.8 
8. Materials-hours  ratio  76.9  87.6  100.0  111.7  115.1  101.2  115.2 
9. Value  added-hours  ratio  69.4  88.9  100.0  78.7  76.9  65.3  62.9 
10. Capital-hours  ratio  77.7  82.2  100.0  112.3  139.5  145.3  n.a. 
11. Materials-value  added  ratio  110.8  98.5  100.0  141.9  149.8  154.9  183.1 
12. Construction  deflator- 
GNP deflator  ratio  106.5  108.9  100.0  105.7  113.2  104.5  114.9 
Canada 
13. Construction  output  per 
full-time  equivalent 
employee  62.0  87.4  100.0  97.0  105.4  126.0  121.3 
14. Construction  deflator- 
GNP deflator  ratio  96.3  92.1  100.0  115.8  124.6  112.0  103.5 
Sources:  Line  1, NIPA,  table  1.4. Line 2,  NIPA,  table 5.5,  total less  mining exploration,  brokers' commissions, 
and  mobile  homes.  Line  3,  Buisiness  Statistics  and  Survey  of  Cuirretit  Buisitness, category  of  index  of  industrial 
supplies  called  "Construction  Products"  or, subsequently,  "Conistruction Supplies."  Line 4,  NIPA,  table 6.2.  Line 
5, NIPA,  table 6.11.  Line 6, John C. Musgrave,  "Fixed  Reproducible,  Tangible Wealth in the United States: Revised 
Estimates,"  Suirvey of Cuirrenit  Busitness, vol.  66 (January 1986), pp. 51-76.  Line 7, lines 2/5. Line 8, lines 3/5. Line 
9,  lines 4/5.  Line  10, lines  6/5.  Line  11, lines  3/4.  Line  12 is line  1, table  19 below,  divided  by GNP  deflator.  Line 
13, Statistics  Canada.  The figure listed under 1986 is,  in fact,  for  1985. Line  14, Statistics  Catnada. 
n.a.  Not  available. 
elements are shown in table 18, and the main  fact to be explained  glares 
out from line 9, taunting  us with its implausibility.  Construction  value 
added  per hour  fell, so the data allege, by 20 percent  between 1967  and 
1972, and by another 20 percent between 1977 and 1986. The value- 
added  and  hours  figures  are shown separately  on lines 4 and 5; between 
1967  and 1986  real value added fell by 12 percent despite a 40 percent 
rise in hours  worked. Since the weights of value added  and of materials 
input  in total construction  output  are roughly  equal, that is, 50-50, the 
value-added  and materials  input  index numbers  on lines 3 and  4 roughly 
bracket  the real new construction  index number  on line 2. This puts a 
helpful  perspective  on the productivity  puzzle. "The reason" that real 
value added in 1986  is 73.4 index points below construction  materials 
input  is that the real new construction  has an index number  32.9 points 
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productivity  puzzle, then, must  involve boosting  the 1986  index number 
on line 2 for real new construction,  or reducing  the 1986  index number 
on line 3 for construction  materials  input (a longstanding  official com- 
ponent  of the index of industrial  production).  Resolutions  could be any 
combination  of an undercount  of nominal  new construction,  an upward 
bias in the construction  deflator(s),  and an overcount  of materials. 
Two factors might  lead to an overcount  of materials.  First, the index 
of industrial  production  (IIP) is compiled from the suppliers'  end and 
takes no account of the nature  of the user. An increase in the share of 
materials  going to users outside the market  construction  sector could 
cause the materials  index in line 3 to overstate the increase  in the use of 
materials  by the market  sector. We have already  expressed skepticism 
that the underground  economy has been growing, and we know of no 
evidence on the relative size of nonmarket  home construction and 
handyman  activity. A second factor is the spread of prefabrication, 
which is likely to cause the IIP to double-count the production of 
construction  materials  for final use. Consider  a shift from doors built 
from  raw  lumber  on-site to prefabricated  doors built  of exactly the same 
lumber.  The economy's final  use of doors is unchanged,  yet the compo- 
nent of the IIP measuring  the production  of prefabricated  doors will 
increase, while the production  of lumber will stay the same. Correct 
practice  would  be to exclude production  of lumber  for intermediate  use. 
We have no explicit evidence that prefabrication  spread more rapidly 
after 1967  than before, but we suggest that the closely similar  growth 
rates of materials  and real construction  output  before 1967,  in contrast 
to their sharply divergent paths after 1967, make prefabrication  a 
plausible  part  of the needed explanation. 
Turning  now from materials to the measurement  of construction 
output  itself, we can put the task in an interesting  way by asking, "How 
much would real new construction in 1986 have to be increased to 
eliminate  the absolute 1967-86 decline in the level of productivity?" 
This would require  an index number  for value added equal to that for 
hours  worked, 140.5,  that  in turn  would  require  an index number  for real 
new construction  of about 151 instead of 128, or an extra 18 percent, 
taking  materials  input as given. Given the large rates of drift between 
alternative  and  official  price  indexes  for  producers'  durable  goods shown 
in table 9, the required  bias for the aggregate  construction  deflator, 18 
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Table 19.  Various Construction Prices, United States, 1929-86,  Selected Years 
Index,  1967 =  100 
Item  1929  1948  1957  1967  1972  1977  1982  1986 
1. Implicit  structures  deflator  35.6  70.0  88.3  100.0  136.9  212.1  332.9  365.3 
2. Construction  materials  price 
index  n.a.  73.1  94.0  100.0  126.2  203.4  293.7  317.4 
3. BLS average  hourly  earnings, 
construction  n.a.  41.7  65.9  100.0  147.4  197.1  283.0  303.6 
4. Implicit  deflator,  residential 
structures  36.6  73.6  90.6  100.0  133.2  209.0  323.5  359.5 
5. Price per square  foot, 
residential  38.5  60.7  85.4  100.0  123.8  198.6  309.2  371.0 
6. Implicit  deflator,  nonresidential 
structures  34.5  64.6  86.3  100.0  139.5  211.4  343.3  362.0 
7. Tornqvist-weighted  price per 
square  foot, nonresidential  35.4  55.2  79.9  100.0  128.3  194.2  363.9  386.2 
8. Implied  quality  per square  foot 
a. Residential  105.2  82.5  94.3  100.0  92.9  94.9  95.4  103.2 
b. Nonresidential  102.6  85.5  92.6  100.0  91.9  91.8  106.0  106.7 
Sources:  Lines  1, 4, and 6 from NIPA,  table 5.5.  Line 2 from Economic  Report of the Presidenit, February 1988. 
Line  3 from  BLS,  Employment,  Hours,  and  Earnings,  1909-84,  vol.  2  (GPO,  1985), p.  912,  and  Suipplemenit  to 
Employmenit and Earnings  (August  1988), p.  278.  Line  5 from  U.S.  Bureau of the Census,  Statistical  Abstract  of 
the United  States, various  issues, table titled "Construction  Contracts."  Line 7, authors'  calculations.  Line 8a is 
the ratio  as a percent  of line 5 to line 4; line 8b is the ratio  as a percent  of line 7 to line 6. 
n.a. Not available. 
small  enough  to be plausibly  explained  away in order  to rid  the economy 
of that  perplexing  productivity  statistic  on line  9. Any added  contribution 
from  an  overstatement  of materials  input  or  an  understatement  of nominal 
construction  output  would make  the task even easier. 
Several of the remaining  lines in table 18 indicate why the existing 
ratio of value added to hours is so implausible.  First, workers are not 
less productive. They handled 15 percent more materials  per hour in 
1986  than in 1967  (line 8). Further,  there is no reason why there should 
have been a substitution  toward materials  and away from labor. As 
shown in table 19, lines 2 and 3, labor  actually  became slightly  cheaper 
over 1967-86  relative  to materials.  Second, the reduction  in value added 
per worker  does not represent  a substitution  away from capital  toward 
labor. The capital-labor  ratio increased substantially,  at least through 
1982.  Finally,  and  perhaps  most  convincing,  is the stark  contrast  between 
the Canadian  productivity  series on line 13  and  the U.S. series on line 9. 
The nearly  parallel  movements of Canadian  and U.S. productivity  for 
1948-67,  followed  by a sharp  divergence,  constitutes  convincing  circum- 
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Canadians  have developed an extensive program  to measure  the prices 
of buildings  by selecting prototype  versions of five types of buildings. 
Rather  than  attempt  to price  the entire  building,  Statistics  Canada  prices 
the component  parts  of the building.  Altogether  about  100  different  items 
are priced.5"  In principle  this technique  resembles the old U.S. "FHA- 
70 cities" index for residential  housing  that  was compiled  between 1947 
and  the late 1960s  but  then was discontinued.52  One  problem  in reaching 
an easy conclusion that the whole explanation  is inferior U.S.  price 
deflators  appears  in table 18, lines 12 and 14, which show no marked 
divergence in the implicit  price deflators  for structures  relative to the 
GNP  deflatorfor  the  two countries.  Clearly,  further  study  of the  Canadian 
data seems called for. 
The task at hand  is to eliminate  the decline in construction  productiv- 
ity, which  we have argued  requires  finding  a bias  in the overall  structures 
deflator  of roughly  0.9 percent  a year  for 1967-86.  Several  series related 
to price movements  are assembled  in table 19. Among  the best hints is 
the behavior of the F. W. Dodge price per square foot series, shown 
separately  for residential  and nonresidential  construction  on lines 5 and 
7. Because of a substantial  shift in composition toward lower-value 
categories, line 7 is constructed  as a Tornqvist  index of seven separate 
categories of nonresidential  construction,  correcting  completely  for all 
available  data  on mix shifts. The ratio  of the price  per square  foot series 
for residential  construction  to the existing  implicit  residential  structures 
deflator,  as shown on line 8a, constitutes  an implicit  index of quality  per 
square  foot. If quality  increases,  then  the crude  index  of price  per square 
foot should rise relative to an index that in principle  corrects for all 
quality changes. The same quality proxy is shown for nonresidential 
construction  in line 8b. 
51. The source  for this description  of the Canadian  methodology  is Paul  Pieper,  "The 
Measurement  of Structures  Prices: Retrospect  and Prospect," paper  presented  at 50th 
Anniversary  Conference,  Conference  on Research  in Income and Wealth,  Washington, 
D.C., May 12-14, 1988. 
52. The annual  growth  rate of the FHA index over 1947-68  was 1.68 percent. This 
does not provide  any indication  of the possible  bias of the bid-price  technique  compared 
to alternatives,  since the FHA index  is the basis  for  half  of the NIPA  residential  structures 
deflator  over the period  1947-63.  The annual  growth  rate  of the implicit  NIPA structures 
deflator  over 1947-68 is 2.37 percent. Comparisons  of the FHA index with various 
backward  extrapolations  of the Census  hedonic  price  index  for single-family  houses, used 
in  the  NIPA  since 1963,  are  in  Robert  J.  Gordon,  "An  Evaluation  of Alternative  Approaches 
to Construction  Price  Deflation,"  unpublished  consultant  report,  August  1969. Martin Neil Baily, Robert J. Gordon  407 
Two aspects of the implicit  quality  indexes strike  us as remarkable. 
First, given the very different  procedures  by which the residential  and 
nonresidential  deflators  are  compiled,  the similarity  of the  implicit  quality 
indexes is  surprising. But more important, and in our view strong 
circumstantial  evidence against  the deflators,  is the conclusion  that  there 
was absolutely  no improvement  in the quality  per square  foot of either 
residential or nonresidential  structures from 1929 to  1986. Two ap- 
proaches seem open to deal with the possibility of deflator  bias. One, 
recently carried  out by Paul Pieper, is to study the components  of the 
official deflators directly and examine their sensitivity to alternative 
methodology.  The second is to compile  direct  evidence on the quality  of 
both residential  and nonresidential  structures. 
Almost all the quantitative evidence available on the quality of 
structures  refers to single-family  residential housing. Since 1963 the 
NIPA residential structures deflator has been based on the Census 
Bureau hedonic price index for single-family  homes (the only other 
hedonic  price index in the NIPA besides the computer  price index);  any 
claim  that quality  improvements  are understated  must  thus be based on 
some flaw  in this index. The hedonic  regression  equation  explains most 
of the cross-sectional variance  of house prices by a single square-foot 
variable and implicitly includes in this coefficient the value of those 
features that typically vary between large and small houses, including 
number  of bathrooms,  size of furnace,  and so forth. However, such an 
index  can  be biased  if features  are  now included  in relatively  large  houses 
that  were not included  two decades ago in houses of the same size. For 
instance, starting  from  zero in 1948  and 29 percent  in 1967,  the share  of 
new houses built with central air conditioning  reached 72 percent in 
198.3  The share of built-in  dishwashers  grew from 45 percent to 82 
percent, with a roughly  similar  performance  for garbage  disposals and 
ventilator  fans. Real production  of wood kitchen  cabinets  increased 157 
percent  between 1967  and 1980,  compared  with a 50 percent  increase  in 
real expenditures on new residential housing and on additions and 
alterations.  Data indicate  a marked  increase  after 1974  in double-glazed 
windows and incidence of wall insulation.  In contrast  to 1969,  when a 
53. Data  in  this  section  come  from  Paul  Pieper,  "The  Measurement  of Real  Investment 
in Structures  and  the Construction  Productivity  Decline"  (Ph.D.  dissertation,  Northwest- 
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BLS survey indicated  that only 0.2 percent of the construction  cost of 
the average home was devoted to nursery  products and landscaping, 
Chicago suburban  developers recently were quoted as spending 2-4 
percent on landscaping.54  The two main  dimensions  of quality  deterio- 
ration  in residential  housing, the shift from plaster  to drywall  and from 
hardwood floors to wall-to-wall carpeting, were largely complete by 
1967. 
Pieper  compiles  construction  indexes  for both  residential  and  nonres- 
idential structures  by several alternative  methods. His own preferred 
index  yields a bias or drift  for total  construction  of 0.6 annual  percentage 
point  for 1963-82,  0.3 point  for 1963-72,  and  0.8 point  for 1972-82.  Most 
of the effect comes from his residential  index, which simply involves 
recalculating  the Census  hedonic  price  index for single-family  houses to 
exclude the largest houses, of a size 2,400 square  feet and over.55  The 
argument  is that  the largest  houses are  most likely to be custom  built  and 
to have an increasing  ratio of amenities to square feet of area, which 
seems to be the main quality characteristic  captured by the Census 
hedonic regression. It is quite likely that Pieper's adjustments  are too 
small, since in previous work he has pointed to numerous  additional 
sources of bias in the Census  price  index that  are not taken  into account 
in the more recent study. Among the most important  of these are a 
downward  bias in the Census estimate  of the portion  of the house price 
constituting land value, which must be excluded from the observed 
house  price  to determine  the  price  of the structure  itself. Another  problem 
is a shift in the regional  composition  of construction  toward  lower-cost 
areas, which is implicitly  treated  by the Census technique  as a quality 
decline. 
Overall,  it seems highly  likely that the residential  deflator  is upward 
biased by at least 1.0 percent a year since 1963, given the number  of 
factors  that Pieper's  0.6 percentage  point  bias estimate  fails to take into 
account. Since the 1967-86  increase  in the implicit  nonresidential  struc- 
tures  deflator  (table 19,  line 6) is almost  identical  to that  of the residential 
structures  deflator,  it is quite likely that the former  is biased at least as 
much. While  we have not come across any explicit evidence on quality 
of nonresidential  buildings, casual observation suggests a significant 
54. "Green  Power:  Landscaping's  Appeal  Grows," Chicago  Tribune,  July  30, 1988. 
55. Pieper  notes that  the price  increase  during  1974-81  for large  houses in the Census 
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improvement  in the quality  and type of materials  included  in the typical 
new retail  store, hotel, or even university  classroom  compared  with its 
counterpart  of 20 or 40 years ago. The typical new office building  is 
constructed  with intermediate  layers between stories, allowing a high 
degree of flexibility and access for electric lines and cooling ducts. 
Heating and air conditioning  control systems are more sophisticated, 
and  elevators  are  faster.  The implied  verdict  of the existing  deflators  that 
the quality of nonresidential  buildings  has increased by just 7 percent 
since 1967  seems dubious  at best. 
As has been true for many years, it is hard to convert this set of 
circumstantial  evidence into a case that would stand  up in court. As the 
next step in the research, a close look at the underlying  ingredients  of 
the Canadian  deflators  and  their  implications  for quality  change, partic- 
ularly  of nonresidential  buildings,  could have a high  payoff. 
Retail Trade 
The provision of convenience can be interpreted  as a technological 
change  that allows the substitution  of low-value  for high-value  hours of 
the day  or  week. Some  evolutions  in the service  industries  may  represent 
the production  by computers  of convenience (24-hour  money machines 
and  bill-paying  services) that  does not enter  GNP; others  may represent 
the  production  of unmeasured  convenience  in  ways  that  reduce  measured 
GNP per employee (24-hour  convenience stores). In discussing  conven- 
ience, we begin  by distinguishing  between three  uses of time: work  that 
pays  the  market  wage, home  time  that  yields  direct  utility,  and  transaction 
time that is an evil needed to produce  both work time and home time. 
The value of a technologically  induced reduction in time required  to 
carry  out transactions  is measured  by the market  wage. If laser scanners 
in supermarkets  reduce average  waiting  time five minutes,  the value of 
the five minutes  is equal  to the average  wage that could be earned  on an 
extra five minutes  of work. If laser scanners allow both a reduction  in 
supermarket  employees and a reduction  in waiting  time, then the value 
of both should be included in measures of output per supermarket 
employee. 
The  value  of home  time  can be differentiated  by time-of-day  and  time- 
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watching  the 11  p.m. news together  may value those particular  hours  of 
home  time  highly,  while  valuing  less highly  2 p.m. on Sunday,  when  they 
have "nothing  to do." The value of 24-hour  money machines, conven- 
ience stores, liberal store closing regulations,  and VCRs can be inter- 
preted  as allowing  the optimal  shifting  of transactions  activities  to lower- 
value  hours.  To provide  an  extreme  example  of the value  of convenience: 
rigid shop-closing hours in Germany cause a given level  of goods 
production  to be sold by fewer people in a short  period  of time, leading 
to a spuriously  high  level of market  productivity  in the German  retailing 
sector, while no account is taken of the congestion, extra transactions 
time  spent  waiting  in line, and  high-value  home  time  unnecessarily  spent 
in transactions.  German  regulations  require  virtually  all retail  establish- 
ments to close at 6:30 p.m. on weekdays and 1:30 p.m. on Saturday 
afternoon, with no Sunday opening at all. If such regulations were 
applied in the United States and they caused five hours a week to be 
shifted  from  $3 an hour  time to $8 an hour  time, the value over the entire 
U.S. population  (aged 16 and over) would be $239 billion, or about 5 
percent  of 1987  GNP. To place this number  in perspective, value added 
by the U.S. retail  sector in 1982  was about  9 percent  of GNP, so clearly 
even a modest  allowance  for  convenience-shift  effects might  offset much 
if not all of the productivity  slowdown in retailing.  The problem,  as we 
shall  see, is that  the spread  of convenience  long antedates  the productiv- 
ity slowdown, and  in the case of supermarkets  actually  works  against  an 
explanation  of the productivity  slowdown. 
RETAIL  TRADE  PRODUCTIVITY  BY  TYPE  OF  STORE 
Retail  trade  makes  a relatively  small  contribution  to the productivity 
growth  slowdown  in the BLS data, as is evident in table  4 above. Since 
retail trade is the most extensively covered area of the services in the 
BLS industry productivity  measurement  program,  it is interesting  to 
compare  the BEA and BLS estimates  of productivity  growth  and to see 
in the more  detailed  BLS data  which  types of retailing  are  doing  well and 
which badly. Once again, we stress, as in the discussion of banking 
above, that no use is made of the BLS industry  data, either  by the BEA 
in measuring  industry output or by the BLS itself in its measures of 
aggregate  productivity. In fact, as far as we can determine, the BLS Martin Neil Baily, Robert J. Gordon  411 
Table 20.  Retail Trade, Productivity Indexes for the Aggregate and for Eight Types 
of Stores,  1958-86,  Selected Years 
Index,  1967 =  100 
Item  1958  1967  1972  1977  1982  1986 
1.  BEA output per hour, retail 
trade  87.3  100.0  106.0  109.3  112.0  121.9 
2.  BLS output per hour, retail 
trade  78.2  100.0  115.3  121.4  125.9  139.1 
3.  Food stores  75.3  100.0  112.6  102.0  95.4  94.9 
4.  Eating  and  drinking  places  91.8  100.0  104.9  102.6  99.1  98.8 
5.  Total food  80.2  100.0  110.3  102.2  96.5  96.0 
6.  Department  stores  n.a.  100.0  107.8  128.4  137.9  167.3 
7.  Apparel  and accessories  n.a.  100.0  111.4  121.8  159.4  198.3 
8.  New cardealers  76.9  100.0  117.2  123.5  124.0  137.4 
9.  Gas stations  77.3  100.0  128.0  158.2  175.2  200.3 
10.  Furniture,  home furnishings, 
and equipment  n.a.  100.0  126.9  142.4  155.6  201.2 
11.  Drugandproprietarystores  68.1  100.0  131.8  149.3  161.0  144.8 
12.  Total nonfood  76.9  100.0  118.6  133.9  145.1  167.2 
Sources:  BEA:  NIPA,  table 6.2,  divided by table 6. 1 B.  BLS:  Productivity Measures for  Selected  Itndustries and 
Government  Services,  BLS  Bulletin  2296,  February  1988, pp.  143-50.  For  share  weights  of  components  used  in 
computing totals  in lines 2, 5, and 12, see Buisiness Statistics,  1984, p. 37. 
n.a.  Not  available. 
never aggregates  its industry  productivity  measures  as we do here and 
in the final  case study. 
Table  20 begins  with BEA output  per hour  in retail  trade  and  provides 
a contrast  with the BLS measures,  both aggregate  and  for eight  types of 
retail  stores, separated  into food and nonfood. The BLS index for food 
store productivity  is shown on line 5, for nonfood  on line 12;  total retail 
productivity appears on line 2. The BLS indexes cover store-types 
accounting  for  fully 82.6  percent  of total 1982  retail  sales. What  pops out 
immediately  from  the page is the stark  contrast  between the experience 
of food and nonfood retailing  since 1972. There has been a sufficient 
productivity  growth  slowdown in food retailing  to qualify  this sector as 
a "basket-case"  industry,  along  with construction,  mining,  and electric 
utilities. For nonfood retailing  there has been virtually  no slowdown. 
The annual  rates of growth corresponding  to the levels in table 20 are 
shown in table 21. The failure  of the BLS index on line 4 of table 20 to 
record any increase in the productivity  in eating and drinking  places 
would make Ray Kroc, the founder  of McDonald's, turn in his grave. 
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Table 21.  Growth of Real Output per Hour in Retail Trade,  1958-86,  Selected Periods 
Percent per year 
Change, 
1958-72 to 
Retail index  1958-72  1972-86  1972-86 
BEA  total  1.39  1.00  -0.39 
BLS  total  2.77  1.34  -  1.43 
BLS  food  2.28  -0.99  -  3.27 
BLS  nonfood  3.09  2.45  -0.64 
Source:  Calculations  based on table 20. 
aspects of consumer  convenience  made  possible by franchised  fast food 
outlets, we suspect that there is room for significant  errors  in deflating 
consumer expenditures  on food. Relatively small quality differences 
seem to  justify substantial  relative  price  differences  in this industry,  and 
it ist  quite likely that the CPI may miss quality  changes over time. For 
instance, the typical  fast food hamburger  is not the same commodity  as 
it was 20 years ago, because more and more fast-food  restaurants  have 
become sit-down  restaurants,  with salad bars no less, and have subtly 
shifted  into a higher  price category.56  Pending  detailed  discussions with 
BLS experts, we leave these thoughts  as conjectures. 
We are on firmer  ground  for stores selling food for consumption  at 
home, that is, supermarkets,  because substantial  quantitative  data are 
available on changes in the nature of supermarkets  over time. The 
puzzling  aspect of the absolute decline in food store productivity  is its 
dramatic  contrast  with the three types of nonfood stores where produc- 
tivity  has doubled  since 1967-gas stations,  furniture  stores, and  apparel 
stores. Special  factors  may explain  the first  two. Gas stations  have been 
affected by the shift to  self-service, which arguably represents an 
unmeasured  decline  in  quality,  and  by a marked  increase  in  the  population 
of automobiles  per available  gasoline pump.57  Furniture  stores, which 
56. We would be extremely  surprised  if exactly the same point were not even more 
true  for hotels. In 1987  a survey of 659 hotels showed the following  percentages  offered 
these guest services:  free parking  (81  percent),  personal  bathroom  amenities  (80  percent), 
audio-video  equipment  (75  percent),  outdoor  pool (61  percent),  free airport  transportation 
(52 percent), and health club facilities (45 percent);  see "Hotels Fight Vacancies with 
More  Services," Wall  Street  Journal,  October  3, 1988. 
57. The 1982  Census  of Retailing  reports  that  the number  of gas pumps  in the United 
States declined  28 percent  between 1972  and 1982,  and that the fraction  of self-service 
pumps  (which  was not reported  in 1972)  was 54 percent  in 1982. Martin Neil Baily, Robert J. Gordon  413 
Table  22. Indicators  of Productivity  and Services  Provided,  U.S. Supermarkets, 
1948-85, Selected  Years 
Index, 1967 =  100, except as noted 
Item  1948  1957  1967  1972  1977  1982  1985 
1. Real sales per hour  58.2  82.0  100.0  106.4  100.8  103.6  92.7 
2.  Real sales per square foot  n.a.  121.6  100.0  97.5  83.6  77.5  75.6 
3.  Real sales per transaction  n.a.  86.0  100.0  98.4  94.0  93.3  97.0 
4.  Square feet per hour worked  n.a.  67.4  100.0  109.1  120.6  133.7  122.6 
5.  Square feet per member of U.S. 
population, 16 and over  n.a.  77.4  100.0  110.3  117.1  123.3  128.8 
6.  Items carried per store  2,200  4,800  7,000  9,000  10,500  13,067  17,459 
7.  Percent stores with complete 
air conditioning  14  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
8.  Percent with mechanical refrigeration 
in produce department  30  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  100  n.a.  n.a. 
9.  Percent with "extensive" delis  n.  a.  n.  a.  46  n.  a.  n.  a.  n.a.  68 
10. Percent selling beer  29  47  55  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  80 
11. Percent open Sunday  5  24  45  55  62  n.a.  n.a. 
12. Percent open seven evenings  22  51  73  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Sources: Supermarket  data from annual  issues of Super Market  Institute, The Super  Market  Inidustry Speaks 
(Chicago,  1986).  Sales deflated  by CPI  for food at home. 1948  figure  for items carried  refers  to 1950. 
n.a. Not available. 
sell electronic goods and appliances, have benefited from a marked 
increase in real value added per transaction.  Apparel  stores remain  as 
the remarkable  success story  that  raises  questions  about  the food sector, 
for the two share  many  physical operations,  including  product  storage, 
shelving, and check out, and bear the same stamp  of computers,  in the 
form  of scanners  and  point-of-sale  terminals. 
What  is the problem  in the supermarket  industry?  The top section of 
table  22  reports  several  productivity  measures,  all  of which  show  declines 
since 1967. Real sales per hour closely mimic the BLS index for food 
stores in table 20, increasing  at a healthy pace through 1972  and then 
declining, while real sales per square foot decline at an erratic pace 
throughout  1958-85.  Real sales per  transaction  are  essentially  trendless. 
The data  shown  imply  a substantial  increase  in square  feet per hour,  that 
is, an increase  in the capital-labor  ratio,  at least until 1982,  and  a roughly 
similar growth in supermarket  square feet per member of the adult 
population. 
The  purpose  of all these square  feet becomes apparent  in line 6, which 
shows  an  explosion  in items  carried  per store  from  2,200  in 1950  to 17,500 
in 1985.  This growth  in the variety  of goods available  provides conven- 
ience to the consumer  by reducing  total transactions  time. Some of the 414  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1988 
scattered figures presented in the bottom of the table document the 
increasing  variety  of goods available  in the typical supermarket  that cut 
the number of shopping trips required by the average consumer to 
purchase  a given market  basket, for example, deli and fresh fish items. 
Also shown are direct measures  of the quality  of the supermarket  itself 
and  of the extension  of opening  hours,  which  directly  reduces  productiv- 
ity by spreading  food shopping  over a greater  amount  of labor  input. 
These factors, however, do not appear  to contribute  an explanation 
of the productivity  slowdown. Every factor, including  the increase in 
variety of items and the extension of hours, was more rapid  in the first 
half of the postwar  period. It appears  from these numbers  that most of 
the productivity  growth slowdown in the supermarket  industry  is real, 
an example of Nordhaus's  depletion  hypothesis.58  We could invent the 
supermarket  only once, just as we could build the interstate  highway 
system only once. Still, something  else has been happening  that repre- 
sents at least a modest role for mismeasurement,  and we believe that it 
can be documented  in due  course. After  moving  almost  completely  away 
from service to self-service in the first half of the postwar period, 
supermarkets  are moving back to service. There is scattered  evidence 
of a movement back toward labor-intensive  services valued by con- 
sumers, including  full-service deli and seafood counters. Most super- 
markets  that  have salad  bars allocate at least one full-time  individual  to 
take care of them. Interestingly,  most supermarkets  have a full-time 
individual  in charge of the electronic scanners, the main purpose of 
which seems to be information  gathering  rather  than  improving  produc- 
tivity.59 
Transportation 
Our  final  case study  illustrates  the last  theme,  the need  for  consistency 
across government  agencies and  the role of inconsistent  data  as a flag  to 
58. William  D. Nordhaus, "Economic Policy in the Face of Declining  Productivity 
Growth," European Economic Review,  vol.  18 (May-June  1982), pp. 131-58. 
59. Over  half  of supermarkets  use scanner  data  for checker  performance,  tracking  the 
results of special promotions,  coupon accounting,  and work scheduling.  Other  uses are 
meat  and  produce  department  analysis,  new product  evaluation,  shelf  allocation,  "shrink 
analysis," and, mentioned  by 21 percent  of respondents,  "price  elasticity." This  list and 
the percentage  responses  are  from  Super  Market  Institute,  Detailed  Tabulations  (Chicago, 
1986),  table  78B. Martin Neil Baily, Robert J. Gordon  415 
Table 23.  Real Growth of Output per Employee, Transportation Sector,  1948-86, 
Selected Periodsa 
Percent  per year 
Change, 
1948-72 
Index  1948-72  1972-86  to 1972-86 
BEA  3.56  0.38  -  3.18 
BLS  3.74b  2.01  -1.73 
Physical  traffic measures  3.32  3.29  -0.03 
Source:  T6rnqvist  averages  from  table  24 below. 
a. Measured  by change  in Tornqvist  average. 
b. BLS index  not available  for 1948-58.  Extrapolated  backwards  using  BEA index. 
indicate the need for improvements  in measurement.  Since this case 
study is mainly in the nature of a report rather  than an analysis, we 
present the overall results first and then discuss them. To assess the 
BEA industry  measures  of transportation  output  per  employee, we have 
developed a comparison  with the BLS industry  measures  for the three 
main modes (rail, truck, and air, accounting for over 75 percent of 
transportation  value added  in 1982).  Since there  is a sharp  disagreement 
between the BEA and BLS measures for rail and air, we have also 
compiled  a simple  index  of traffic  (ton-miles  for  rail  and  truck,  passenger- 
miles for air)  for comparison.  As seen in table 23, the measured  growth 
rates  of output  per  employee  show  a sharp  productivity  growth  slowdown 
for BEA, a substantial slowdown but four times faster productivity 
growth  after 1972  for BLS, and  no slowdown  at all  for  the physical  traffic 
series. The productivity  series for the three modes are aggregated  using 
the Tornqvist  method, with nominal  value-added  shares in each sub- 
interval  as weights. Since the BEA and  physical  measures  are available 
back  to 1948,  but  the BLS measure  only to 1958,  we push  the latter  back 
by linking  it to the BEA measure.  While  this makes  the close accordance 
of the 1948-72 BEA and BLS growth rates partly spurious, the actual 
measures  do grow at absolutely identical  rates between 1958  and 1967, 
before  diverging  after 1967. 
Turning  to the detailed  productivity  growth  rates in table 24, we can 
contrast  the modest BEA 2.3 percent annual  growth rate for railroads 
over 1972-86 with the much faster BLS rate of 4.7 percent and the 
physical index rate of 5.4 percent. For airlines  the BEA figures  are in 
even greater  disagreement,  registering  a decline at an annual  rate of 0.2 
percent compared  with increases for the BLS of 3.6 percent and the 416  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1988 
Table 24.  Alternative Productivity Growth Rates for Selected Transportation Industries, 
Output per Employee, 1948-86,  Selected Periods 
Percent per year 
Itemn  1948-58  1958-67  1967-72  1972-77  1977-82  1982-86 
BEA 
1. Railroads  2.16  6.44  1.35  2.24  -2.32  8.15 
2. Trucking  2.76  3.06  4.32  2.20  - 2.55  0.06 
3. Air transportation  7.11  5.08  3.02  1.89  -4.14  1.97 
4. Tornqvist  average  2.70  4.75  3.15  2.14  -2.85  2.20 
BLS 
5. Railroad  revenue  traffic  n.a.  6.11  3.79  2.34  1.92  11.07 
6. Intercity  trucking  n.a.  2.42  3.80  1.13  -1.39  1.39 
7. Air transportation  n.a.  8.04  5.05  3.54  2.77  4.61 
8. Tornqvist  average  n.a.  4.75  4.04  1.97  0.32  4.18 
Physical  output per employee 
9. Railroad  freight  ton-miles  2.80  5.77  4.49  2.95  4.14  10.03 
10. Intercity  trucking  ton-miles  2.76a  0.82  1.03  1.32  1.65  4.09 
11. Scheduled  airline  passenger  miles  8.82  5.23  6.94  4.28  4.51  2.51 
12. Tornqvist  average  3.20  3.50  3.26  2.39  2.88  4.92 
Addendum: Airline price  inidex, 
final year of each period,  1967  =  100 
13. BEA PCE deflator  for air 
transportation  72.8  100.0  131.2  193.2  400.0  381.2 
14. Fixed-weight  index, revenue 
passenger  coach-class  yield, 
domestic  and international 
U.S. scheduled  industry  112.8  100.0  127.0  153.4  225.3  205.3 
Sources: BEA data from NIPA, tables 6.2 and 6.10. BLS data from BLS Bulletin  2296, pp. 134-38. Physical 
output:  railroads  from  Railroad  Facts, various  editions;  trucking  industry  employment  and  intercity  freight  by mode 
from Statistical  Abstract,  table titled "Class I Intercity  Motor  Carriers  of Property,  by Carrier,"  various  issues; 
airline  output  and employment  from  Air Transport  Association,  Air Transport,  various  issues. 
n.a. Not available. 
a. Trucking  not available  for 1948;  extrapolated  backwards  by BEA index  from  line 2. 
physical measure  of 3.9 percent. For trucks the three respective rates 
are  much  lower, and  the BEA and  BLS are  closer together:  - 0. 1 percent 
and  0.3  percent,  respectively,  as contrasted  to 2.2 percent  for  the  physical 
output  measure. 
While  we have not determined  the cause of the railroad  and trucking 
discrepancies,  the cause of the BEA's error  in measuring  airline  output 
is amazingly  simple-the  BEA (or perhaps  the CPI  division  of the BLS) 
forgot  to take account  of airline  discount  fares. This fact is documented 
at the bottom  of table 24, where we compare  the implicit  NIPA deflator 
for  consumer  purchases  of air  transportation  with  a fixed-weighted  index 
of domestic and international  coach air "passenger yields," that is, 
revenue  collected per passenger-mile.  The BEA deflator  implies  that  air Martin Neil Baily, Robert J. Gordon  417 
fares almost tripled  from 1972  to 1986, while the yield index suggests 
that  the actual  price  paid  increased  by about  60 percent.60 
The BLS indexes may be preferable  to the physical  output  measures, 
because they take into explicit account shifts  in mix between  high-value 
and low-value freight. But in the context of our earlier discussion of 
computer  services, the simple  physical measures  raise as an additional 
measurement  issue the net effect of changes in the quality  of a ton-mile 
or passenger-mile.  Railroad  and trucking  services are mainly interme- 
diate  goods, so that this question  is moot for the aggregate  productivity 
slowdown, except insofar as computers improve the working  lives of 
railroad  and trucking  employees. But airline  services are purchased  by 
consumers as well as businessmen. Most of the perceived quality 
improvement  in airline  services has been contributed  by the computer, 
as discussed above, and much  of any perceived deterioration  due to air 
traffic  delays can be attributed  to the lack of parallel  investment  in new 
air traffic  control computers by the Federal Aviation Administration. 
Because the BLS and physical output measures for airlines agree so 
closely, any remaining  scope for mismeasurement  of the quality of a 
passenger-mile  will need to collect detailed  evidence and weigh factors 
on both sides. Our  final proviso is that any such study should include 
output and labor input in travel agencies, since these have taken over 
much  of the former  role of airline  reservations  agents, leading  to at least 
some  upward  bias  in  all  the airline  productivity  measures  examined  here. 
Conclusion 
We have uncovered large potential errors in the measurement  of 
productivity  at the industry  level. However, as we have stressed since 
the beginning  of the paper, the discovery of measurement  errors  at the 
industry  level merely  reshuffles  the locus of productivity  growth  unless 
it can be shown that data on aggregate  real output  and (for ALP) labor 
input  are  subject  to error.  Further,  some  of the errors  we have  discovered 
60. We are aware  that passenger  yield varies by length  of haul  and would be biased 
downward  if there  were  a substantial  increase  in  length  of haul.  However,  between  October 
1977  and October 1987,  length  of haul  actually  decreased  slightly  for the U.S. domestic 
trunk  airlines, from 833 to 816 miles. Source: monthly traffic  reports as published  in 
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may have applied not just in the slowdown period, but in the pre- 
slowdown  period. This is particularly  true of our study of construction 
prices, since the available data on quality per square foot provide 
evidence of improvements  in quality  per square  foot before the advent 
of the productivity  slowdown, not  just during  the slowdown  period. 
In  this concluding  section  we limit  our  overall  assessment  to measures 
of ALP, since MFP measures  require  a more complex computation  of 
effects on both output  and capital  growth,  with considerable  sensitivity 
to the weights chosen for capital's income share. At the level of ALP, 
we can classify our discussion of measurement  issues by quadrant  on 
the grid introduced  at the beginning  of the paper. We are looking for 
errors in the critical northwest quadrant, errors that matter in the 
aggregate  economy and contribute  to the slowdown. We have demon- 
strated  effects on aggregate  output  of deflation  errors  in a wide range  of 
producer  and consumer  durable  goods, but these do not help, because 
they are in the northeast  quadrant,  indicating  roughly  the same degree 
of GNP mismeasurement  before  as after 1973  (in table 10  the top section 
for GNP indicates  almost  identical  errors  before and after 1973;  there is 
a small  contribution  in the right  direction  for MFP shown at the bottom 
of that  table).  Pointing  in the right  direction  are  the effects of computers, 
which we have documented  for several components of finance, insur- 
ance, and real estate, and the deflation  error  for consumer  purchases  of 
airline services. 
Taken together, however, our specific quantitative  contributions  in 
the northwest corner are relatively small. The combined share of 
consumer  expenditures  on business services and on airline  transporta- 
tion is 4.1 percent  of 1982  GNP, so even an outside  estimate  of a positive 
3 percent annual contribution  to the slowdown would add only 0.12 
percentage point to productivity  growth. We conjecture that further 
study could raise this to 0.2. The labor quality literature  adds a little 
more. Denison found a contribution  of labor quality to understanding 
the slowdown  of about  0.  1 point, which  with a dose of Jorgenson  and  his 
colleagues  might  be raised  to, say, 0.2 point, and Bishop's test data, we 
suggested, could add another 0.1 point to that. On balance, then, 
measurement  issues, at least those that  we have quantified  to date, could 
account for only about 0.5 point of the full 1.5 point slowdown, mostly 
from  the labor  input  side. Martin Neil Baily, Robert J. Gordon  419 
Other  important  parts  of GNP that  could be sources of measurement 
error  are not necessarily  located in the northwest  quadrant  of our grid. 
Clearly  any payoff must come from finding  measurement  problems  in 
nondurable  consumption  (24.3  percent  of GNP in 1982)  or services (32.4 
percent). But measurement  errors could just as well belong to the 
northeast corner; for example, errors in measuring the benefits of 
synthetic  fabrics  or in the improved  quality  of medical  care could apply 
just as well before 1973  as after.61  The same is true  for our case study of 
construction;  we concluded that the absolute decline of construction 
productivity  after 1967  was likely to be spurious, but there is no good 
reason to think that most of the same biases did not occur as well in 
earlier  years, leaving  the productivity  growth  slowdown  in construction 
intact, even if at a higher  level. 
The payoff to studies of measurement  issues appears to be much 
greater  at the industry  level. Our  new price deflators  for durable  goods 
radically  change all the standard  data on the ratios of investment and 
capital  to GNP, the relative  prices  of investment  and  consumption  goods, 
and the relative  productivity  of durable  manufacturing  to other parts  of 
the economy. We find that non-goods-producing  industries  like com- 
munications,  utilities, and transportation  have been credited  for MFP 
gains more  appropriately  counted  as the payoff to research  and innova- 
tion in durable  manufacturing.  All studies of investment  and the payoff 
to R&D, among others, are affected by these results and will need to 
take them into account. 
An interesting  aspect of productivity  in the postwar  period emerges 
from our case studies. Between 1948  and 1967  most industries  exhibit 
highly  similar  productivity  growth  rates;  after 1967  this unified  advance 
fragments.  The cross-industry  variance  of productivity  growth  is much 
greater  in  the slowdown  period,  even at  the  disaggregated  level. Railroads 
and  airlines  boom, while trucking  slumps. Apparel  and furniture  stores 
become more productive  rapidly,  while productivity  falls at supermar- 
kets. Construction  productivity  goes down, while  construction  materials 
input  goes up. This pattern  seems consistent  with the view of a common 
61. Or a careful  study of clothing  quality  might  point in the opposite direction.  See 
Francine  Schwadel,  "Complaints  Rise  about  Clothing  Quality,"  Wall  Street  Journal,  June 
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impetus  to productivity  advance in the early postwar years, perhaps  a 
backlog  of innovations  and  investment  opportunities  delayed  by depres- 
sion and war, followed, after the mid-1960s,  by a depletion  of opportu- 
nities and a reversion to more normal  differentiation  of each industry 
segment. 
Finally,  we have  developed  substantial  quantitative  evidence  showing 
that  ALP growth  in particular  sectors and  industries-chief among  them 
banking, securities, insurance, railroads,  and airlines-has  been sub- 
stantially  understated  in the BEA data, particularly  after 1973.  In fact, 
the fragmentary  data we have examined for banking and securities 
suggest that these industries  may well have experienced some of the 
fastest rates  of growth  of ALP in the entire  economy, next to computers 
and other electronic durable  goods. As we carry out these crude pilot 
studies, we are struck  with the potential  for much fruitful  work at the 
detailed industry level, and we must express some frustration  in the 
present  lack of coordination  between the BEA and BLS in this regard. 
The BEA should examine the consistency or lack thereof between its 
industry  output  indexes  and  those developed  in  the BLS industry  studies, 
as in transportation.  The BEA should take into account the research 
effort  that  the BLS has devoted to such industries  as banking.  The shoe 
is on the other foot when it comes to price measurement.  Why should 
the PPI fail to incorporate  the BEA's computer  price index? And how 
long must  users of government  statistics  put  up with the total  lack of any 
PPI for the single most important  component  of PDE, communications 
equipment,  when the PPI contains literally  hundreds  of detailed com- 
modity indexes for nuts, bolts, pipes, flanges, valves, cans, barrels, 
pails, tanks, hinges, cleats, knives, and other crude products  of lesser 
economic importance? Comments 
and Discussion 
William  D. Nordhaus: Martin  Baily and  Robert  Gordon  have written  a 
highly  informative  paper  on the productivity  growth  slowdown, empha- 
sizing  the role of potential  measurement  errors,  especially  those relating 
to the growing  use of computers.  In the end, they find  that  measurement 
errors  explain little of the slowdown, but along the way they uncover 
many  fascinating  and  controversial  problems. 
At the outset, I would  like to register  a concern  about  the surprisingly 
ahistorical  stance of economists toward the slowdown in productivity 
growth,  which we are analyzing  as if it were a slowdown  in the speed of 
light. But surely there is nothing  automatic  about 3.2 percent per year 
growth  in  labor  productivity.  A glance  backward  over  this  century  shows 
that U.S. productivity  growth slowed significantly  at least twice: pro- 
ductivity  growth  was absent  from  1901  to 1917  and  was extremely  modest 
from 1924 to  1937.' Moreover, other countries have shown widely 
varying  productivity  experience  and  have also experienced  sharp  changes 
in productivity  growth  from  decade to decade. 
To put this point in a different  way, given that Solow and Denison 
were unable to identify the sources of productivity  growth in the first 
place, we should  not be surprised  if the growth  disappears.  Productivity 
growth  is no more  mysterious  at 1 percent  per year than  at 3 percent. 
Turning  to the results  of the paper,  I find  myself largely  in agreement 
on most points. In my remarks,  I will focus on some of the areas where 
their  analysis seems a bit off target. One of the major  puzzles of recent 
years is why the tremendous  increase in computer  power and use has 
not  caused  more  productivity  growth.  Because computers  are  largely  an 
1. See William  D. Nordhaus,  "Economic  Policy  in the Face of Declining  Productivity 
Growth,"  European  Economic  Review,  vol. 18  (May-June  1982),  pp. 131-58. 
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intermediate  product,  the mismeasurement  issue in computers  involves 
understatement  of both output  and  input. 
On the output  side, although  much  has been made  of the phenomenal 
growth in manufacturing  productivity during the  1980s, the role of 
computers  in that surge  has been largely  ignored.  In fact, the enormous 
growth  in computer  output  has been largely  responsible  for the rebound 
in  manufacturing  productivity  over  the  past  decade.  The  following,  taken 
from  the authors'  table 4, shows the average  annual  percentage  growth 
in labor  productivity  in three subperiods: 
Sector  1948-73  1973-79  1979-87 
Manufacturing  2.87  1.43  3.49 
Manufacturing  less nonelectrical 
machinery  2.96  1.53  2.19 
Fully two-thirds  of the rebound  in manufacturing  productivity  growth 
after 1979  was due to the rapid  productivity  growth  in computers  (which 
is part  of nonelectrical  machinery). 
A second feature of inclusion of computers  is the potential  error  in 
aggregation  of capital.  Measured  by the revised  hedonic  index, the share 
of computers  in constant-dollar  investment  rose from 1.6  percent  in 1969 
to 25.3 percent in 1986. We should be cautious about productivity 
measures  that simply  aggregate  computers  and other capital  goods into 
the stock of K to be used in productivity  measures.  A simple  aggregation 
would violate the capital-aggregation  requirement  that relative capital 
goods rentals are unchanged.  Using conventional  data on the share of 
computers in the capital stock, a simple calculation indicates that 10 
years after  the base year, the growth  of capital  could be overstated  by a 
factor of two if the standard  technique for constructing  total factor 
productivity is used. The underestimate  of total factor productivity 
growth  might  be as much  as half a percent  a year. 
Paradoxically,  if we are  to use an overall  capital  aggregate  rather  than 
appropriately  weighted  subaggregates,  the old "naive" measurement  of 
computer inputs (which approximately  measures computer prices by 
the prices  of other  capital  goods) would  provide  more  accurate  estimates 
of computers'  contribution  to productivity  growth. 
One of the themes that  runs  through  Baily and  Gordon's  study is that 
there is a large component of unmeasured  quality change in services. 
Two particular  aspects are stressed: the change in the number of 
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While I tend to agree that we have understated  the quality change 
associated with products, Baily and Gordon  may overstate the quality 
change in product  variety and services. Start with the first  example of 
quality  change, the increase in the number  of commodities. They cite 
the example  of grocery  stores, where  the number  of goods has risen  from 
2,200 in 1948  to 17,459  in 1985.  To assess the expanding  choice, I went 
to the local grocery store. I found that about 5 percent of the shelves 
were devoted to cereals, including  dozens of brands  such as Freakies, 
Mueslix, Twinkies, Kix, Kasli, Total, Life, and Just Right. You might 
ask yourself  how much  your  net economic welfare  would  decrease  if the 
number  of cereals were reduced  by half. 
The other example of quality change used by the authors is the 
amenities  associated  with services. Here, I would  think  that  the contrary 
case is pretty strong. I am reminded of the visiting European who 
recently left his shoes in the hallway of the Holiday Inn to get shined. 
He was awakened  at two o'clock in the morning  by the house detective 
who advised him to retrieve his shoes or risk going barefoot in the 
morning. 
Just to recall some of the deterioration  in the quality  of services, you 
may want to remember  the doctor's house call, the butcher's custom 
steaks, and the tailor's custom suits. Yale men had daily maid service 
and  sit-down  meals, and  undergraduates  were even taught  by the faculty 
rather than by graduate students. If you bought gasoline, you could 
expect to come away with a clean windshield  and  free maps  rather  than 
dirty  hands. And who has recently  enjoyed  a gourmet  meal on Amtrak? 
In short, the authors have a strong case when they argue that many 
products  have undergone  unmeasured  quality  change;  but  to extrapolate 
that  argument  to services requires  excessive suspension  of disbelief. 
But let us assume they are right  about quality  change. Are we better 
off because of all the proliferation  of Corn  Pops and  Freakies?  The issue 
of the optimal  amount  of product  differentiation  is a profound  one, and 
industrial  organization  economists reason that even if tastes are not 
manipulated,  a market  economy can easily produce excessive quality 
change because of  the setup costs  of  product differentiation. The 
appropriate  test here is to ask what tax or subsidy you would require, 
over the existing official price increase, to shop in a modern grocery 
store,  to ride  on Amtrak,  to get your  hair  cut, as compared  with  the same 
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Finally,  say that  you believe that  the quality  of services  of the butcher, 
the baker,  and  the candlestick  maker  has improved.  To contribute  to an 
explanation  of the productivity  slowdown, there must  be an increase in 
the growth  of unmeasured  service quality  change  since 1973. 
In the area  of construction,  the puzzle of falling  productivity  has long 
plagued productivity  experts. I find myself unswayed by the paper's 
reasoning,  which basically dismisses the result as "taunting  us with its 
implausibility."  There is a circular  reasoning  that dismisses the results 
because of incredibility,  while finding  nothing  other  than  some mysteri- 
ous Canadian  data  to substitute  for existing  approaches. 
At the end of the day, the authors conclude that the quantifiable 
measurement  errors  explain only 0.5 percentage  point of the 1.5 point 
slowdown, with 0.3 point coming from deterioration  in the quality of 
labor,  0.  1 point  coming  from  the mismeasurement  of airline  productivity, 
and  another  0.1 point  coming  from  a "conjecture"  that "further  study" 
will yield another  0.1 percentage  point. 
The 0.3 point  from  labor  is quite  fragile.  First, two of the three  studies 
show contrary  results, and  only the Jorgenson  study shows a significant 
decline in labor quality. Second, as the paper explains, the Jorgenson 
study stops before the apparent  upturn in the returns to education 
occurred, and that study attributes lower productivity to  shifts in 
occupation  and  industry.  Third,  the estimated  impact  of lower  test scores 
raises questions because the increase in test scores may reflect the 
increasing  obsession with  studying  for  test-taking  techniques  rather  than 
studying  for content;  to the extent that  it reflects  a genuine  deterioration 
in ability, that decline should already  be captured  in the age variables, 
with the lower productivities  of later cohorts reflected  in lower relative 
wages; and the increase in the coefficient is an indefensible statistical 
procedure. 
Of the 0.2 percentage  point from  airlines  and other consumer  expen- 
ditures,  it should  be noted  that  the increase  in airline  productivity  comes 
during  1979-87,  so it can hardly  explain  the early  part  of the slowdown. 
And the conjectures  about  further  study cannot  substitute  for evidence. 
Pending  further  evidence, I believe that the only reliable  evidence of a 
mismeasurement  component  of the productivity  slowdown is the Deni- 
son figure  of decline in quality  of labor  inputs  of around  0.1 percentage 
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At the end of the day, I would  have to conclude  that  there's not much 
gold  in  the  hills  of mismeasurement.  But  this  conclusion  was  foreordained 
in Baily and Gordon's table 2, where we saw that the productivity 
slowdown  was as pronounced  in industries  with  well-measured  output- 
mining, manufacturing  (outside of computers),  and utilities-as  it was 
in poorly  measured  industries  like services and  FIRE. Those who toil in 
the vineyards  of productivity  are not yet out of work. 
David Romer: In the good old days, productivity  data were like most 
other standard  economic time series: they were quite useful as long as 
you did not make the mistake  of thinking  hard  about where they came 
from. In the case of price indexes, for example, if one were to set out to 
construct  an economically  appropriate  price  index, one would soon find 
that  there  were deep problems  involving  the absence of any representa- 
tive consumer  in the economy, the treatment  of new commodities, the 
treatment  of quality  changes,  and  so on, that  probably  made  the  construc- 
tion of a "valid" price index impossible. Still, knowing  all that, econo- 
mists rely on price indexes: for example, none of us seriously doubts 
that  the indexes that  show inflation  at roughly  2 percent  in the mid-  1960s 
and  at roughly  10  percent  in 1980  reflect  a genuine  change  in  the  economy. 
Similarly, despite the profound conceptual difficulties in measuring 
productivity, economists have generally believed that the measured 
slowdown in the growth  of output  per worker-hour  after 1973  reflected 
a real  and  important  change  in the economy. 
The central  message that I take from  the paper  by Baily and Gordon 
is that the view that productivity  data, despite whatever  imperfections 
they may have, are a useful tool is simply not correct in the case of 
industry-level  data.  Baily  and  Gordon  criticize  disaggregate  productivity 
data  on two fronts. First, they point out several readily  identifiable  and 
quantitatively  large  problems  with the data-such  as the measurement 
of output by labor input in some industries and the inadequate or 
nonexistent  treatment  of changes  in quality  in others. Second, Baily and 
Gordon  point out that the data are often obviously unreasonable.  The 
most striking  example of this is that measured  output  per worker-hour 
in construction  is lower today than  it was 40 years ago. 
The  long-term  solution  to the problem  of inadequate  industry  produc- 
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do a  serious job  of  measuring output by industry and to  account 
systematically  for changes in quality. However, it is an open question 
whether  that  is going  to occur in the foreseeable  future. 
In  the  meantime,  there  is a  possible  short-term  solution  to the  problems 
with the industry-level  productivity  data that Baily and Gordon  appear 
to be sympathetic  toward,  but  that  I think  should  be treated  with  caution. 
That  solution  is to make  corrections  to the  data  until  one obtains  estimates 
that appear reasonable. For example, Baily and Gordon note that 
plausible  corrections  to the structures  deflator  could  yield  sensible  figures 
for productivity  growth  in construction,  and that sensible adjustments 
for  the convenience  associated  with  branch  banking  and  for  new  financial 
instruments  could result in a more reasonable banking productivity 
series. The problem  with this approach  is that  when the data  are  fraught 
with difficulties, then if correcting one problem does  not produce 
estimates that appear  reasonable,  it is easy to find additional  problems 
to correct. The procedure  can be continued until something approxi- 
mating  the desired  figures  is obtained.  If one is not careful,  this approach 
may not be dramatically  different  from  simply  making  up the data. 
In contrast  to their  findings  concerning  industry-level  data, Baily and 
Gordon conclude that the measurement  issues that they explore are 
probably  not important  to variations  in measured  aggregate  productivity 
growth.  I find  this plausible,  for two reasons. First, as Baily and  Gordon 
point out, these issues and errors  are longstanding;  although  they may 
cause trend  productivity  growth  to be mismeasured,  there  is no particular 
reason to expect the size of the error  to change over time, and thus no 
particular  reason to expect measurement  error to account for large 
variations  in productivity  growth  rates. Second, most industries,  partic- 
ularly  those where measurement  problems  seem especially severe, are 
small relative to the economy; even large changes in the error in 
measuring  productivity  growth  in one or two industries  will have little 
impact  on measured  aggregate  productivity  growth.  Thus I come away 
from the paper  with my initial  belief concerning  aggregate  productivity 
statistics-that  although  they suffer  from a variety  of problems  both in 
principle  and in practice, they are a useful tool that for the most part 
reflects  genuine  economic developments-largely unshaken. 
The paper thus makes two main contributions.  The first is warning 
economists away from disaggregate  productivity data: unless one is 
interested  in correcting  these data, it appears  to be a good rule simply Martin Neil Baily, Robert J. Gor-don  427 
not to use them. It is a nice change to have a paper pointing  out the 
pitfalls in a set of data before rather  than after dozens of papers have 
been written  drawing  striking  conclusions  from  those data. The paper's 
second contribution  is its uncovering  of numerous  errors,  inconsisten- 
cies, and questionable practices in the productivity data. Baily and 
Gordon's  efforts will, I hope, be put to good use by the BEA and the 
BLS in improving  industry  and (to a smaller  extent) aggregate  produc- 
tivity measurement,  and  by others working  in the field. 
Let me now turn to the "computer puzzle."  One of the central 
questions  running  through  the paper  is "What  have all those computers 
been doing?" or, more prosaically, "Why has the vast increase in 
investment in computer  power not been reflected in higher measured 
productivity  growth?"  It seems to me that there is no mystery here at 
all. It is a basic  rule  of growth  accounting  that  large  changes  in  investment 
cause only small changes in output. The reasons for this are that 
investment  is a small  fraction  of GNP and that the marginal  product  of 
capital  is small.  Since  computers  are  a quite  small  part  of total  investment, 
a vast increase in investment in computers would yield only a small 
increase in measured  output  even if all the computers  were being used 
productively  and  were generating  measured  output. 
To be more precise about this, consider the following calculation. 
Suppose  that  computers  depreciate  linearly  over eight  years  and  that  the 
marginal  product  of capital  is 15  percent;  reasonable  variations  in these 
parameters  would have little effect on what  follows. With  these param- 
eters, the stock of real computing  capital grew by a factor of 30 from 
1965  to 1986.  Despite  this  vast increase,  however, the stock  of computing 
capital in 1986  amounted  only to about $210 billion in 1982  dollars, or 
about 6 percent of a year's GNP.' If the marginal  product  of capital  is 
0.15, it follows that computers  are increasing  output  by slightly  under 1 
percent. These calculations imply that if computers are being used 
productively,  they have raised  the average  annual  growth  rate  of output 
over the past two decades by roughly a twenty-fifth  of a percentage 
point. I can imagine  sensible variations  on this calculation  that would 
raise  or  lower  this  figure,  either  for  the economy  as a whole  or  for specific 
1. I measure  computer  investment  using  NIPA, table  5.7, line  4-  "Office,  computing, 
and  accounting  machinery."  The higher  capital  stock figures  in Baily and  Gordon's  table 
12  simply  reflect  the  fact  that  their  figures  include  communication  equipment,  instruments, 
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industries,  by a few factors of two. But the number  seems to be in the 
right  ballpark.  In short, asking why the vast investment  in computers 
has not had a discernible  impact on productivity  growth  is a little like 
asking  why the pull  of gravity  is not noticeably  stronger  when the moon 
is on the opposite side of the earth  than  it is when the moon is above us. 
I would  like to conclude with a more speculative  comment  about  the 
relationship  between what the productivity data tell us and popular 
perceptions of changes in standards  of living. According to the data, 
productivity  growth  has slowed in recent decades but has continued  to 
be positive. But popular  perceptions appear  to be quite different:  the 
economic  circumstances  of ordinary  Americans  are widely perceived  to 
be worse, not better, than they were two decades ago. For example, 
most Americans  believe that  the main  reason  that  so many  more  women 
are working today than in the 1950s and 1960s is simply economic 
necessity. Now I have no doubt  that  the story  told by the data  is broadly 
correct:  a moment's  reflection  is enough  to convince  one that  the quantity 
and  quality  of goods that  can  be commanded  by a typical  worker's  wages 
today are greatly  superior  to what they were a generation  ago. But this 
raises a puzzle: why does the public  appear  to perceive otherwise?  For 
example, is the change in the growth  rate of productivity  an important 
determinant  of economic satisfaction?  Or might it be that achieving a 
certain  positive growth  rate is needed simply to make us feel no worse 
off than  before? 
The purpose of economic growth is not to increase material  wealth 
but to increase economic satisfaction  and well-being.  Answering  ques- 
tions like the ones above is thus extremely important.  If it is true that 
while at any given time an increase in output would raise economic 
satisfaction  but that in the long run there is no relation between the 
absolute  level of income  and  economic  satisfaction,  then  pursuing  higher 
output is a futile way of attempting  to reach the underlying  goal of 
improved  economic well-being. Since it is surely the case that produc- 
tivity growth is not the only determinant  of economic well-being, and 
since it may not even be the main  determinant,  perhaps  a more  pressing 
task than attempting  to understand  variations  in productivity  growth  is 
trying  to understand  what  in  fact are  the major  determinants  of economic 
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General  Discussion 
Robert  Hall  believed  that  the authors'  investigation  brought  into  focus 
five  developments  that  can  explain  all  but  a small  fraction  of the slowdown 
in productivity  growth:  overcapacity  and pollution  controls in electric 
utilities,  safety  and  environmental  regulations  in  mining  and  the  depletion 
of mineral  resources, mismeasurement  of airline  discounts, increased 
product  variety  in retailing  and  elsewhere, and  a shift  toward  remodeling 
and  customized  construction.  He noted  that  a recent  paper  by Kevin M. 
Murphy,  Andre  Shleifer,  and  Robert  Vishny  provides  a theoretical  basis 
for the importance  of the last two factors.  ' According  to those authors, 
the growth of the middle class creates mass markets for relatively 
homogeneous goods that exploit scale economies in production and 
distribution.  More  recently,  the opposite  shift  has  occurred  in the United 
States as the distribution  of income has tilted in favor of the upper- 
income groups, who prefer  to consume specialty goods produced  on a 
much  smaller  scale. 
Charles Schultze disagreed  with Hall's emphasis on environmental 
policy for explaining  the slowdown in productivity  growth, noting  that 
Edward Denison had found these effects to be small. Schultze also 
questioned  Baily  and  Gordon's  presumption  that  mismeasurement  could 
possibly explain  the productivity  slowdown. Even if it could explain  the 
slowdown  in the United States, mismeasurement  would  not account  for 
the simultaneous  slowdown  worldwide.  Baily noted that the slowdown 
outside the United States could simply mean that the technology gap 
between  the rest of the developed  world  and  the United States had  been 
closed. The contribution  to productivity  growth  that came from  closing 
that  gap  is no longer  available  to the rest of the world.  Bradford  De Long 
noted that the exhaustion of productivity  growth has a precedent: it 
recalls  the dramatic  slowdown  in the growth  of Great  Britain's  GNP per 
capita  in the first  quarter  of this century. 
The discussion turned  to the dramatic  decline in the level  of produc- 
tivity  in  construction.  Gregory  Mankiw  noted  that  unmeasured  increases 
in the quality  of housing  coming  from  customization  should  explain  not 
1. Kevin  M. Murphy,  Andre  Shleifer,  and  Robert  Vishny, "Industrialization  and the 
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only the decline in measured  construction  productivity  but a 20 percent 
to 30 percent  increase  in measured  real housing  prices as well. Because 
the price  of new homes has not increased  that  much  relative  to the price 
of existing  homes, Mankiw  was skeptical  of the customization  explana- 
tion. Robert Gordon noted that much of the increase in the cost of 
housing  reflects  escalation  of land  prices, which is common  to both new 
and  old housing  and  masks  the growth  in construction  costs. 
Schultze pointed out that the comparison of U.S.  and Canadian 
construction  productivity  and prices presented  in table 12 deepens the 
puzzle. Over  the comparison  period  of almost  40 years, the real  price of 
structures  in both countries  fluctuated  but showed no significant  trend. 
Yet relative  to national  productivity  growth, construction  productivity 
performed  much  better  in Canada  than  in the United States. If failure  to 
capture  quality  improvements  in the U.S. price index was the cause for 
the relatively poor U.S.  productivity  performance,  the reported real 
construction  price should have risen substantially  faster in the United 
States than  in Canada. 
Jack Triplett  reported  on work at the Bureau  of Economic Analysis 
using superlative  index numbers  to create a new series for real output. 
Compared  with the current  deflation  procedure,  the new output series 
grows faster before the benchmark  year (1982)  and slower afterwards. 
He also noted that the current  BEA airline  deflator  averages the CPI 
index  and  an  index  of average  revenue  per  passenger  mile  (on  the  grounds 
that the two measures  have offsetting quality  errors).  Finally, Triplett 
felt that David Romer  was overly skeptical  about  the value of industry- 
level productivity  measures. Because BLS industry  productivity  data 
use output in the numerator,  while the authors  use as their numerator 
BEA gross product  originating  by industry  (equivalent  to value added), 
the two series will diverge at times, even if both are measured  without 
error. 
Michael  Lovell agreed  that increases in product  variety  are valuable 
but reasoned that some method of measuring  their value was needed. 
To quantify the benefits to the consumer from increased quality and 
variety he referred  to a revealed preference  test invented by Richard 
Ruggles. Individuals  would be given a choice of spending  their income 
on items in a 1988 Sears catalog or some fraction of their income on 
items from the 1973 catalogue. The income fraction at which there is 
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quality  offset prices. Finally, he noted that the socially optimal  degree 
of product  differentiation  rises when a technology such as computers 
lowers setup  costs. 
Henry Aaron noted that test scores fell simultaneously  for all grade 
levels, suggesting  the fall may  tell more  about  social attitudes  than  about 
the quality  of education  acquired  by new entrants  to the labor  force. It 
may be true that labor  quality  has diminished  at the same time that test 
scores have fallen, but this is not evidence of causation. 